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NO PROMO HETERO: CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO BE QUEER 
Clifford J. Rosky† 
  This Article argues that the state has no legitimate interest in promoting 
heterosexuality or gender conformity during childhood. Although 
opponents of LGBT rights have longed cited this goal as one of the primary 
justifications for discrimination against LGBT people, it has no 
constitutional foundation upon which to stand. 
  Building upon a schema familiar to legal scholarship on LGBT rights, 
this Article challenges the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality in 
childhood by articulating a tripartite defense of children’s homosexual 
speech, status, and conduct. It argues that these three aspects of children’s 
homosexuality are connected to and protected by the Constitution’s free 
speech, equal protection, and due process guarantees.  
  When the state attempts to justify policy by claiming that promoting 
heterosexuality in childhood is a legitimate state interest, it violates at least 
one if not all of these guarantees. When the policy targets children’s 
homosexual speech, it is a form of viewpoint discrimination that violates 
the free speech protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. When 
the policy targets children’s homosexual status, it is a form of animus 
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people that violates the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the policy 
targets children’s homosexual relationships, it is a form of moral 
disapproval of homosexual conduct that violates the due process protections 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Taken together, these 
constitutional guarantees require the state to maintain a neutral stance 
with respect to the sexual orientation of children’s speech, status, and 
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conduct. In doing so, they guarantee every child’s equal liberty to be straight 
or queer. 
  After developing a similar critique of the state’s interest in promoting 
gender conformity during childhood, this Article concludes by exploring the 
theoretical advantages, limitations, and implications of this constitutional 
framework. Drawing on one of queer theory’s foundational texts, it argues 
that the paradigm of No Promo Hetero is more universal than traditional 
identity claims, yet more liberal than traditional diversity claims. By 
proceeding from premises that are both liberal and queer, this Article makes 
a case for the liberation of all children’s queerness—as viewpoint, identity, 
and behavior—within existing paradigms of constitutional law. 
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In our democracy . . . it is not the province of the State, even if it were 
able to do so, to dictate or even attempt to influence how its citizens 
should develop their sexual and gender identities. This approach views 
homosexuality in and of itself as a social harm that must be 
discouraged, . . . something that Lawrence specifically proscribes. 
Judge Rosemary Barkett1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article challenges one of the oldest axioms of discrimination 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people—the 
premise that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting 
heteronormativity during childhood. It argues that the state may not 
pursue this policy in childhood for the same reasons that it may not 
pursue this policy in adulthood: The state’s promotion of 
heteronormativity is foreclosed by the Constitution’s guarantees of free 
speech, equal protection, and due process. These doctrines require the 
state to remain neutral regarding the trajectory of children’s sexual and 
gender development. Simply put, the state has no legitimate interest in 
encouraging children to be straight or in discouraging them from being 
queer. 
Put differently, this Article argues that every child has a 
constitutional right to be queer. Like all children’s rights—indeed, like 
 
 1 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 575, 578 (2003)). 
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all constitutional rights—a child’s right to be queer is not absolute. It 
must be balanced against a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and 
control of her child and the state’s interest in protecting all children’s 
welfare. But within these parameters, every child has a right to an open 
future in sexual and gender development—an equal liberty to be straight 
or queer.2 
For a very long time, our legal system has presumed otherwise. In a 
wide range of settings, officials have justified discrimination against 
LGBT people by invoking what might be called “the fear of the queer 
child”3—the premise that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting 
heteronormativity and discouraging queerness during childhood. The 
simplest version of this fear is that “exposure to homosexuality would 
turn children into homosexuals,”4 but the idea is considerably more 
capacious, flexible, and nuanced than this flat-footed statement suggests. 
In the broadest sense, it includes the fears that exposing children to 
homosexuality and gender variance will make them more likely to 
develop homosexual desires, engage in homosexual acts, form 
homosexual relationships, identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transgender, or deviate from traditional gender roles. 
Notwithstanding the LGBT movement’s remarkable progress in 
recent years, examples of this fear are not far to seek. In 2004, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida law prohibiting any “homosexual” 
from adopting children was justified by the State’s interest “in shaping 
sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role 
modeling.”5 In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals held that a law 
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying was justified by the notion 
that “a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, 
living models of what both a man and a woman are like.”6 Although 
courts are rarely willing to specify the “benefits” that heterosexual 
parents bestow, phrases like “role modeling” and “living models” are 
hardly ambiguous: By definition, a “model” is “an example for imitation 
or emulation,” and a “role model” is “a person whose behavior in a 
 
 2 See Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 
1980); Orly Rachmilovitz, Masters of Their Own Destiny: Children’s Identities, Parents’ 
Assimilation Demands and State Intervention 29, 51 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Paper No. 13-35, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308988 (forthcoming 98 MINN. L. REV.). 
 3 Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607 (2013). 
 4 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., 
Brown v. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 5 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 6 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
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particular role is imitated by others.”7 
In popular and political debates over LGBT rights, more strident 
versions of these fears are still commonplace. In 2008, the sponsors of 
Proposition 8, a ballot initiative to prohibit same-sex couples from 
marrying in California, aired a television commercial in which a young 
girl told her mother: “Mom, guess what I learned in school today? . . . I 
learned how a prince married a prince, and I can marry a princess!”8 In 
2010, the Traditional Values Coalition warned Americans that if 
Congress passes the Employment Non-Discrimination Act—a bill that 
prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity—“every homosexual, bisexual, and transgender teacher 
will have free reign to indoctrinate our children into accepting these 
‘alternative lifestyles’ as normal and good.”9 In 2012, the American 
Family Association objected that an anti-bullying program known as 
“Mix It Up at Lunch Day,” which encourages students “to hang out with 
someone they normally might not speak to,” was actually “a nationwide 
push to promote the homosexual lifestyle in public schools.”10 
Since the earliest days of the LGBT movement, advocates have 
responded to these fears by attempting to debunk them—by insisting 
that they are based on nothing more than myths and 
misunderstandings.11 In one case after another, advocates have observed 
that the role modeling theory cannot be true, because “the vast majority 
of lesbian and gay adults were raised by heterosexual parents” and “the 
vast majority of children raised by lesbian and gay parents grow up to be 
heterosexual.”12 Above all, they have argued that children cannot be 
 
 7 Model Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
model (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); Role Model Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/role+model (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 8 Yes On 8: It’s Already Happened (ProtectMarriage.com television advertisement 2008), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PgjcgqFYP4; Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003; 
Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 381 (2009). 
 9 The Issues, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, http://web.archive.org/web/20100
313120658/http://www.endahurtskids.com/issues (accessed through the Internet Archive index, 
as captured on Mar. 13, 2010).  
 10 Kim Severson, Seeing a Gay Agenda, a Christian Group Protests an Anti-Bullying 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at A15 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 11 For a more detailed exploration of the LGBT movement’s responses to indoctrination, 
role modeling, and public approval fears, see Rosky, supra note 3, at 665–84. 
 12 Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 20–21, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214). This claim has been 
included in numerous amicus briefs filed in support of challenges to laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage and adoption by same-sex couples, and it has long been a staple of legal scholarship 
on lesbian and gay parenting. See, e.g., id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological 
Ass’n in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2–23, Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 
859 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2604); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Psychological Association et al. in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 13, Dep’t Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006) 
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influenced through mechanisms such as indoctrination, role modeling, 
and public approval because an individual’s sexual orientation and 
gender identity are fixed early in life and cannot be learned, taught, 
chosen, or changed.13 
Without gainsaying the validity of these empirical claims, this 
Article develops a new line of constitutional attacks against the state’s 
fear of queerness in childhood. Rather than assailing the factual premise 
that the state has the ability to influence children’s sexual and gender 
development, it challenges the legal premise that the state has any 
justification for doing so. Based on principles of constitutional law that 
are commonly invoked to protect LGBT adults, it argues that the state 
may not promote heteronormativity among children, for the same 
reasons that it may not pursue this goal among individuals of any age. 
Properly construed, the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments oblige 
the state to be neutral regarding the trajectory of any individual’s sexual 
or gender development. In short, whether children are straight or queer 
is none of the government’s business. 
Because the promotion of heteronormativity in childhood has long 
served as one of the primary justifications for discrimination against 
LGBT people, the practical implications of this argument are numerous. 
For several decades, opponents of LGBT rights have successfully 
invoked fears of children being influenced by indoctrination, role 
modeling, and public approval to justify a broad range of policies that 
discriminate against LGBT people—laws that deal not only with child 
welfare issues like marriage, parenting, and education, but even 
seemingly unrelated subjects like sodomy, employment, and housing.14 
If the promotion of heteronormativity is not even a legitimate state 
interest, then policies governing all of these subjects are vulnerable to 
constitutional attack. 
 
(No. 05-814); Brief of American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(No. 17716); Brief of American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 36-38, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44); Brief of 
American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 44–
47, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological 
Ass’n at 40-44, Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1); Carlos A. 
Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring With Wardle: Morality, Social Science and Gay and Lesbian 
Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 287; Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the 
Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001). 
 13 See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 63, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-
16696) (“[T]he vast majority of gays and lesbians have little or no choice in their sexual 
orientation; and therapeutic efforts to change an individual’s sexual orientation have not been 
shown to be effective and instead pose a risk of harm to the individual.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). For a withering critique of such arguments, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual 
Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 503 (1994). 
 14 See Rosky, supra note 3, at 635–64. 
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Although the argument’s scope is broad, the argument’s burden 
turns out to be surprisingly modest. When the state’s promotion of 
heteronormativity is subjected to constitutional review, it turns out be 
an exceptionally weak justification for discrimination against LGBT 
people. In almost every instance, opponents of LGBT rights have 
presented this objective as a free-standing justification for 
discriminatory policies: The state must do X because it will encourage 
children to be straight; the state must not do Y, because it would 
encourage children to be queer.15 Today, this type of empirical 
prediction begs a line of legal questions that seem increasingly obvious: 
So what if it’s true?16 So what if a governmental policy makes children 
less likely to be straight or more likely to be queer? For the government’s 
purposes—or indeed, for anyone’s—what’s wrong with children being 
or becoming queer? 
As these questions suggest, the state’s interest in promoting 
heteronormativity depends on the premise that straightness is better 
than queerness. But once this premise is taken for granted, it renders 
circular any justification that relies upon it: In effect, the argument 
invokes one premise to support another, but it fails to explain why or 
how either of these premises could be justified. If the promotion of 
heteronormativity in children is a legitimate state interest, then it must 
be justified on independent grounds—as a means to an end, not an end 
in itself. 
The Article has six parts. Part I introduces a provisional framework 
for distinguishing among policies that target children’s homosexuality 
as a form of speech, status, and conduct. It argues that each of these 
aspects of children’s homosexuality is protected by at least one of three 
constitutional guarantees. When a policy targets children’s homosexual 
speech, it is a form of viewpoint discrimination that violates the free 
speech protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.17 When a 
policy targets children’s homosexual status, it is a form of animus 
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people that violates the equal 
 
 15 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse 
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1327, 1329 (2000). 
 16 See LAURA BENKOV, REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND 
GAY PARENTS 63 (1994) (“It seems society is not yet ready for a more deeply challenging 
response to the question of whether the kids of homosexuals will grow up to be gay—namely, 
so what if they do?”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 863 (2002) (“[N]either gay 
adults nor gay children will have achieved equality with their straight counterparts until the 
ultimate orientation of wavering children is a matter of state and social indifference.”). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. I; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Free Speech Clause applies to state 
governments, as well as the federal government, by virtue of “incorporation” into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.18 
When a policy targets children’s homosexual relationships, it is a form 
of moral disapproval of homosexual conduct that violates the 
substantive due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.19 Taken together, these guarantees demonstrate that the 
state has no legitimate interest in promoting heterosexuality among 
children—and conversely, that every child has a constitutional right to 
be queer. 
Parts II through VI develop the content and the scope of this 
principle of constitutional law, while addressing a handful of objections, 
challenges, and particulars. Part II addresses a few minor stumbling 
blocks to constitutional claims based on children’s homosexual status 
and conduct—the limiting language in Romer v. Evans,20 Lawrence v. 
Texas,21 and United States v. Windsor,22 the Supreme Court’s leading 
opinions on the rights of lesbian and gay people under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. This Part argues that although these rulings 
contain language that judges have invoked to limit their scope, none of 
this limiting language is relevant to the question at hand. As the Court 
explained in Romer, laws that discriminate against a group based on 
animus offend a principle of constitutional law that is “conventional and 
venerable”—“a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”23 Even under a modest reading of Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor, the promotion of heterosexuality in children 
does not rank as a “legitimate” state interest. As a result, any law 
justified on this ground fails even the lowest standard of judicial review. 
Part III confronts a more significant hurdle to constitutional claims 
based on children’s homosexual conduct—the vexing question of how 
children could have a liberty to engage in homosexual conduct, if they 
may not have a liberty to engage in sexual conduct of any kind. If one 
presumes that the state may discourage children from having any and all 
sexual relations, does that imply that the state may specifically 
discourage children from having homosexual relations? In this instance, 
does the state’s broad authority to regulate all of children’s sexual 
conduct encompass a more specific power to regulate only children’s 
homosexual conduct? This Part considers three ways of resolving this 
 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause applies to the 
federal government, as well as state governments, by virtue of “reverse incorporation” into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has not distinguished 
between the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 20 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 21 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 22 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 23 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
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dilemma—by defending children’s homosexual conduct as a form of 
speech, as a proxy for status, or as an instance of conduct itself. It argues 
that all of these claims are supported by the governing case law and 
should be advanced by LGBT litigators, scholars, and activists alongside 
each other. Even if children do not have a broad liberty to engage in 
sexual conduct, they still have an equal liberty to choose between 
homosexual or heterosexual conduct. 
Stepping outside of this analytical framework, Part IV considers 
whether the state’s promotion of heterosexuality in childhood can be 
justified on independent grounds—as a rational means of pursuing 
another objective, rather than as an end in itself. After briefly reviewing 
a few justifications that schools have advanced in First Amendment 
cases, this Part argues that the promotion of heterosexuality in 
childhood is not rationally related to the state’s interests in public 
health, responsible procreation, or responsible parenting. On the 
contrary, the government has a more compelling interest in promoting 
homosexuality in childhood, to protect children from the risks of 
teenage pregnancy and parenthood. 
Although this Article deals at more length with the state’s 
promotion of heterosexuality, Part V turns to the state’s interest in 
promoting gender conformity. As a matter of law or logic, there is no 
reason to think that this interest would fare any better under the 
doctrines laid out in Parts I through IV. If anything, the illegitimacy of 
this interest should be even clearer, because the Supreme Court has long 
held that state action may not be justified by reference to sex 
stereotypes.24 To date, however, courts have been slow to apply these 
well-settled principles to discrimination against gender-variant 
plaintiffs—including gender-variant children—and the case law in this 
area is less developed. Drawing on Paisley Currah’s work, this Part 
examines how the courts have favored children who present gender as 
the assertion of an “identity,” rather than as the expression of a 
“viewpoint,” or a type of behavior.25 More recently, however, children 
have been able to successfully present gender as both identity and 
viewpoint, challenging the primacy of “gender identity” in this emerging 
body of constitutional law. 
Part VI theorizes this Article’s constitutional claims under the 
banner of “No Promo Hetero,” a phrase borrowed from Lisa Duggan’s 
 
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (“The justification . . . . must 
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of 
males and females.”); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975) (“A child, male or female, is 
still a child. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, 
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”). 
 25 Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Gender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 
3, 19 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). 
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trailblazing essay Queering the State.26 This Part claims two advantages 
for the principle of No Promo Hetero—universalism and liberalism. On 
the one hand, No Promo Hetero is more universal than traditional 
identity claims, because it is not premised on the immutability of any 
child’s sexuality or gender. Rather than claiming that the state has no 
ability to shape children’s sexual or gender development, it insists that 
this question is irrelevant, because the state has no legitimate reason for 
doing so. On the other hand, No Promo Hetero is more liberal than 
many traditional diversity claims, because it does not call upon the state 
to endorse or applaud children’s queerness, and it does not directly 
regulate the speech or conduct of private actors. Instead of insisting that 
there is nothing wrong with children’s queerness, it maintains only that 
the rightness or wrongness of queerness is a moral and religious matter, 
which the state lacks the authority to resolve. By attacking only the 
state’s promotion of heteronormativity, the Article makes a 
comprehensive case for the liberation of all children’s queerness within 
the prevailing parameters of constitutional law. 
I.     CHILDREN’S HOMOSEXUALITY AS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people is 
sprawling; it is manifest in a wide variety of institutions, practices, 
doctrines, and discourses. At one time or another, the state’s interest in 
promoting heterosexuality among children has been invoked to justify 
most, if not all, policies that discriminate in this manner. In order to 
analyze the legitimacy of this interest, it is useful to begin with a 
conceptual framework of the policies that it has been invoked to defend. 
Building upon a schema familiar to legal scholarship on LGBT 
rights, this Part analyzes the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality 
in childhood—and conversely, children’s right to homosexual 
development—in terms of speech, status, and conduct. It argues that 
these three aspects of homosexuality are connected to and protected by 
the Constitution’s free speech, equal protection, and due process 
guarantees. When the state claims that promoting heterosexuality in 
childhood is a legitimate state interest, it violates at least one if not all of 
these guarantees. 
A.     The Constitution of Homosexuality 
In legal scholarship on lesbian and gay rights, scholars have 
distinguished among policies that target homosexuality as a form of 
 
 26 Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, 39 SOC. TEXT 1, 8–9 (1994). 
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speech, status, and conduct.27 Speech-based policies target people for 
expressing homosexual feelings, thoughts, or ideas—e.g., for identifying 
as lesbian, gay, or bisexual or supporting lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
rights.28 Status-based policies target people for being homosexual, often 
without defining what it means to “be” homosexual.29 Conduct-based 
policies target people for engaging in homosexual behavior—e.g., for 
hugging, kissing, or engaging in more overtly sexual behavior with a 
same-sex partner.30 
In law and in life, the boundaries between speech, status, and 
conduct do not always exist—and when they do, they are often easily 
blurred. To take one of many examples: When a man identifies himself 
as “gay,” his announcement may be intended or interpreted as a 
declaration of status, an expression of desire, an acknowledgment of 
conduct, or any combination thereof.31 In light of these conceptual 
overlaps, it is easy to see that anti-homosexual policies may target 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in more ways than one, and thus, such 
policies may be subject to challenge on more than one ground.32  
It is vital to remember, however, that the overlaps among these 
concepts are not complete, so each claim remains independently valid 
 
 27 See, e.g., Nan. D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1719 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hunter, Identity] (“[H]omosexuality is not merely, or either, status or conduct. It is 
also, independently, an idea.”); see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: 
A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1617–41 (1993) (analyzing distinction between status and 
conduct); David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First 
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 
(1994) (analyzing distinction between speech and conduct); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About 
Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993) 
(analyzing distinction between status and conduct); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: 
Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000) (analyzing distinction 
between speech and status). 
 28 See, e.g., Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Ed. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 
1984) (describing Oklahoma statute that prohibited teachers from engaging in “[p]ublic 
homosexual conduct,” which it defined as “advocating . . . encouraging or promoting public or 
private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will 
come to the attention of school children or school employees” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 29 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (describing amendment to Colorado 
Constitution that prohibited state and municipal authorities from granting “[p]rotected 
[s]tatus” based on “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,” in addition to “homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual . . . conduct, practices or relationships” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 30 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (describing Texas statute that 
prohibited individuals from engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of 
the same sex” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31 See JANET HALLEY, DON’T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY ANTI-GAY POLICY 55 
(1999) (arguing that under the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, “a servicemember’s 
statement, ‘I am gay’ . . . involves status and conduct”). 
 32 See Cain, supra note 27, at 1617–41 (arguing that LGBT litigators should pursue 
constitutional claims based on status and conduct, rather than attempting to “bifurcate” the 
two concepts from one another). 
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and valuable. When a policy targets homosexual conduct, for example, 
it targets more than just lesbian, gay, and bisexual people; in addition, it 
targets anyone who engages in homosexual conduct without identifying 
as lesbian, gay, or even bisexual. For this reason and others,33 it is useful 
to distinguish among anti-homosexual policies based on speech, status, 
and conduct, and to understand why the government has no legitimate 
interest in discouraging homosexuality in any of these forms. 
The sections that follow develop the argument that depending on 
how the government’s interest is formulated—as an attempt to target 
children’s speech, status, or conduct—these policies will necessarily 
violate the Constitution’s free speech, equal protection, or due process 
guarantees. Section B considers the government’s interest in suppressing 
children’s homosexual speech; Section C, children’s homosexual status; 
and Section D, children’s homosexual conduct. 
In the course of this analysis, it becomes evident that each of these 
constitutional guarantees embodies a kind of baseline prohibition 
against the use of circular reasoning in constitutional law. 
Unsurprisingly, our Constitution forbids the government from 
restricting an individual’s or a group’s constitutional rights based on 
nothing more than discomfort, animus, or disapproval—even if these 
objections are voiced by the public at large, rather than the government 
itself. Under any standard of review, the government must provide 
independent justifications for restricting individual rights, rather than 
positing the denial of liberty or equality as a goal in itself. 
B.     Free Speech 
Does the First Amendment allow the state to specifically target 
children’s homosexual speech—to discourage children from expressing 
pro-gay opinions or same-sex sexual desires? 
More than anywhere else, the state’s authority to influence 
children’s sexual and gender development has been delimited in cases 
applying the First Amendment in public schools. In the turmoil of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases 
establishing that the First Amendment protects the speech rights of 
public school students, even when students were engaged in the 
advocacy of illegal conduct. First, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Court held that a school could not 
restrict a student’s speech based on “a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
 
 33 In addition, speech and conduct claims are less essentializing than status claims, because 
they do not depend on the premise that sexual orientation is immutable or fundamental to an 
individual’s personhood. See infra Part VI.B. 
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viewpoint”; instead, the school was required to show that the student’s 
speech would “materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”34 
Next, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court held that the government 
cannot prohibit individuals from engaging in “advocacy” of illegal 
conduct, “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”35 Finally, in Healy v. James, the Court held that a state 
college could not restrict a group’s speech and association rights “simply 
because it finds the views expressed by [the] group to be abhorrent.”36 
Shortly after Healy was decided, gay students across the country 
began organizing groups and seeking official recognition on college 
campuses.37 When schools denied these requests, officials often claimed 
that the recognition of a gay student group would foster the spread of 
homosexuality on campus. In the first of these cases, Gay Students 
Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner, the 
University had initially agreed to recognize the Gay Students 
Organization (GSO), granting them the same privileges as other student 
groups.38 But after the GSO sponsored a dance, the Governor objected, 
and the school barred the group from sponsoring any further “social 
functions” on campus.39 When the students sued, the school argued that 
it had an “obligation and right to prevent activities which the people of 
New Hampshire find shocking and offensive”40 and an interest “in 
preventing illegal activity, which may include ‘deviate’ sex acts, 
‘lascivious carriage,’ and breach of the peace.”41 
The University’s claims were rejected by the district court and 
again by a three-judge panel of the First Circuit. Applying Healy, the 
district court held that the school could not curtail the GSO’s speech 
simply because it considered the group’s message to be “abhorrent.”42 
Applying Tinker and Brandenburg, the First Circuit added that “there 
ha[d] been no allegation that any . . . illegal acts took place at the GSO 
social events,” and the school’s policy could not be justified by “[m]ere 
‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension’ of illegal conduct.”43 
 
 34 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 35 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 36 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972). 
 37 Cain, supra note 27, at 1608–10; Hunter, Identity, supra note 27, at 1702. 
 38 509 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 661. 
 41 Id. at 662. 
 42 Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088, 1102 (D.N.H. 1974), 
aff’d as modified, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 
(1972)). 
 43 Gay Students, 509 F.2d at 662 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
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In a subsequent case, Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, the state’s 
interest in discouraging homosexuality was more explicitly raised and 
rejected.44 In 1971, a group known as Gay Lib applied for formal 
recognition as a student organization at the University of Missouri.45 In 
the group’s statement of purposes, the students expressed the intentions 
to “provide a dialogue between the homosexual and heterosexual 
members of the university community,” “dispel the lack of information 
and develop an understanding of the homosexual,” and “alleviate the 
unnecessary burden of shame felt by the local homosexual 
population.”46 Anticipating the University’s objections, the group added 
the disclaimers that “Gay Lib does not seek to proselytize, convert, or 
recruit,” and that “[a]s an educational group, Gay Lib does not advocate 
any violation of state statutes,”47 an implicit reference to Missouri’s 
sodomy law. 
The University was not satisfied. In denying the group’s request, 
the University reasoned that “[t]here are potential or latent 
homosexuals, i.e. persons who come into adolescence or young 
adulthood unaware that they have homosexual tendencies,” and that 
“[w]hat happens to a latent or potential homosexual from the 
standpoint of his environment can cause him to become or not to 
become a homosexual.”48 If Gay Lib were formally recognized, the 
University found that such recognition would: “(1) . . . tend to reinforce 
the personal identities of the homosexual members of those 
organizations . . . ; (2) tend to cause latent or potential homosexuals who 
become members to become overt homosexuals; [and] (3) tend to 
expand homosexual behavior which will cause increased violations” of 
Missouri’s sodomy law.49 
Gay Lib filed suit in federal court, arguing that the University’s 
decision violated the group’s First Amendment rights.50 In 1976, the 
district court denied Gay Lib relief, based on the testimony of two 
psychoanalysts who predicted that formal recognition of the group 
would “tend to further homosexual behavior” and “promote such sexual 
contact.”51 Like the University, the experts reasoned that the group was 
likely “to reinforce the personal identity and behavior of the individual, 
bringing like people together,”52 and that “wherever you have a 
 
 44 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). 
 45 Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1353–54 (W.D. Mo. 1976), rev’d, 558 F.2d 
848 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 46 Id. at 1354 n.1. 
 47 Id. at 1354 n.2. 
 48 Id. at 1359. 
 49 Id. at 1358 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50 See id. at 1353. 
 51 Id. at 1368–69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52 Id. at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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convocation of homosexuals, . . . you are going to have increased 
homosexual activities.”53 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed this 
ruling, reasoning that the University’s fears of homosexual recruitment 
and advocacy had not been sufficiently proved.54 In particular, the court 
found that there was “no historical or empirical basis”55 for the 
testimony of the two experts, and that “none of the purposes or aims of 
Gay Lib . . . evidences advocacy of present violations of state law.”56 
Significantly, the court added that even if the expert predictions were 
factually accurate, they would still not be sufficient to justify the school’s 
denial of Gay Lib’s request: “Even accepting the opinions . . . at face 
value, we find it insufficient to justify a governmental prior restraint on 
the right of a group of students to associate for the purposes 
avowed . . . .”57 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gay Lib, allowing the 
Eighth Circuit’s ruling to stand.58 In a dissent from this ruling, then-
Justice Rehnquist articulated an especially vivid example of the fear of 
homosexuality’s spread among students.59 Although he acknowledged 
that Gay Lib had disclaimed any intention “to proselytize, convert, or 
recruit,”60 he reasoned that “the meeting together of individuals who 
consider themselves homosexual in an officially recognized university 
organization can have a distinctly different effect from the mere 
advocacy of repeal of the State’s sodomy statute.”61 The effect he was 
referring to, of course, was the spread of homosexuality on the school’s 
campus. 
Justice Rehnquist went on to speculate that this risk might be 
especially high at universities: “As the University has recognized, this 
danger may be particularly acute in the university setting where many 
students are still coping with the sexual problems which accompany late 
adolescence and early adulthood.”62 To illustrate the virulent nature of 
homosexuality on college campuses, he then explained that from the 
University’s point of view, the question of whether Gay Lib should be 
recognized was “akin to whether those suffering from measles have a 
constitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate 
together and with others who do not presently have measles, in order to 
urge repeal of a state law providing that measle [sic] sufferers be 
 
 53 Id. at 1369 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id. at 856. 
 57 Id. at 854. 
 58 Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). 
 59 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 60 Id. at 1083. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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quarantined.”63 Although he did not explicitly delineate the mechanism 
through which homosexuality would be transmitted, he clearly implied 
that the group’s advocacy of gay rights would lead more students to 
develop homosexual desires, engage in homosexual acts, and identify as 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 
Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist’s reservations, gay students 
have enjoyed an unblemished record in cases involving the recognition 
of student groups.64 Most recently, in Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. 
Pryor, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated an Alabama law that denied 
“public funds” and the use of “public facilities” to “any organization or 
group that fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by 
[Alabama’s] sodomy and sexual misconduct laws.”65 Applying the basic 
principles developed in cases like Bonner and Gay Lib, the court 
reasoned that the law was not viewpoint neutral, because it did not 
“prohibit discussion of the sodomy or sexual misconduct laws in 
general.”66 Although the law permitted funding for student groups that 
promoted “compliance with the sodomy or sexual misconduct laws,” it 
prohibited funding for any group that promoted “violation of the 
sodomy or sexual misconduct laws.”67 “This is blatant viewpoint 
discrimination,” the court held.68 “The statute discriminates against one 
particular viewpoint . . . .”69 
By the time that Pryor was decided, a national organization known 
as the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network had begun building 
a network of Gay-Straight Alliances (GSAs) in high schools across the 
United States.70 Within a few years, these new organizations had won 
another impressive string of victories under the First Amendment. In a 
series of cases litigated in Utah, California, and Kentucky, federal 
district courts have repeatedly recognized that the First Amendment 
protects the freedom of public school students to establish GSAs for the 
 
 63 Id. at 1084. 
 64 See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997); Gay 
Student Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1324–33 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing First 
Amendment right of association); Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay 
Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 165–67 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
university’s refusal to register gay student organization violated First and Fourteenth 
Amendments); Gay Activists Alliance v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 638 P.2d 1116, 1122–
23 (Okla. 1981) (holding that student group has First Amendment right to organize and be 
recognized by university). 
 65 110 F.3d at 1545 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Id. at 1549. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 KEVIN JENNINGS, MAMA’S BOY, PREACHER’S SON: A MEMOIR OF GROWING UP, COMING 
OUT, AND CHANGING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 211–30 (2006). 
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purpose of expressing “gay-positive views.”71 As one of these courts 
explained, “[w]hatever forum the [school] may create for students’ free 
expression of ideas, it may not pick and choose among . . . ideas or 
viewpoints.”72 
Remarkably, none of the high schools in these cases have even 
attempted to justify bans against GSAs by invoking a governmental 
interest in promoting heterosexuality or discouraging homosexuality 
among students. Conceding the validity of the rulings in Bonner, Gay 
Lib, and Pryor, schools have instead argued that restrictions against 
GSAs were “viewpoint neutral” and that the formation of GSAs would 
“materially and substantially interfere” with the school’s activities.73 All 
of these arguments have failed. 
In Boyd County High School Gay Straight Alliance v. Board of 
Education, a federal court in Kentucky clarified that schools could not 
evade the First Amendment’s bar against viewpoint discrimination by 
deferring to the objections of anti-gay students.74 Under Tinker, the 
court explained, a GSA’s application for recognition could be denied 
based only on a “disruption” caused by the GSA itself, rather than a 
disruption caused by the group’s opponents.75 To rule otherwise, the 
court reasoned, would be to grant the GSA’s opponents a “heckler’s 
veto.”76 Under this well-known doctrine, a school’s refusal to recognize 
a GSA must be based upon something other than objections to the 
group’s message—even if the objections are voiced by other students, 
rather than anyone employed by the school.77 
In a closely related line of cases, federal courts have held that 
Tinker protects a gay student’s “right to be out,”78 in addition to the 
right of students to establish gay-straight alliances. In Henkle v. Gregory, 
Derek Henkle was a sophomore at Galena High School in Reno, 
Nevada, and he had appeared on a local television show about gay high 
school students.79 When he returned to school, his classmates harassed 
him. When he reported this misconduct to school officials, they not 
only failed to protect him but “told him numerous times to keep his 
 
 71 Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670 
(E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 
2000); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 
1166, 1175 (D. Utah 1999). 
 72 E. High, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. 
 73 See Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 690–91; Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41; E. High, 81 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1175. 
 74 258 F. Supp. 2d at 689–90. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 689. 
 77 See id. 
 78 STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN 
AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 23–40 (2010). 
 79 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1069 (D. Nev. 2001). 
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sexuality to himself.”80 When Henkle requested a transfer to another 
school, school officials granted the transfer “conditioned on the fact that 
he keep his sexuality to himself.”81 In his effort to comply with these 
instructions, Henkle “removed buttons, pertaining to his sexuality, from 
his backpack.”82 In addition to claiming that the school’s failure to 
protect him from bullying violated the Equal Protection Clause, Henkle 
claimed that the school’s admonitions to keep his sexuality to himself 
violated his freedom of speech under the First Amendment.83 The 
district court agreed: Denying a motion to dismiss Henkle’s speech 
claim, the court explained that Tinker established “a broad right that 
would encompass the right of a high school student to express his 
sexuality.”84 
Most recently, a federal court in Florida clarified that Tinker 
protects any student’s freedom to express pro-gay views—even students 
who do not identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In Gillman ex rel. 
Gillman v. School Board for Holmes County, “Jane Doe” was beginning 
her senior year at Ponce de Leon High School, a public school in a rural 
community in the Florida panhandle.85 On the first day of school, Jane 
told a teacher’s aide that she had been taunted by a group of middle 
school students, who had called her a “dyke” and told her that 
“‘dykes’ . . . were ‘nasty,’ ‘gross,’ and ‘sick.’”86 The aide reported this 
incident to the principal, who called Jane to his office.87 During this 
meeting, the principal asked Jane if she had told the teacher’s aide that 
she was a lesbian; she said yes. Then he asked her if she was, in fact, a 
lesbian; she said yes.88 The principal then told Jane that “it was not 
‘right’ to be homosexual,” and he asked if her parents knew.89 When she 
said no, he asked for her parents’ telephone number so that he could 
inform them, and he warned her to “stay away” from the middle school 
students or he would suspend her.90 Jane left the principal’s office in 
tears.91 
The next day, Jane’s classmates learned what the principal had said 
to her, and a false rumor circulated that Jane was absent from school 
because the principal had suspended her for being a lesbian.92 
 
 80 Id. at 1075. 
 81 Id. at 1070. 
 82 Id. at 1075. 
 83 Id. at 1071. 
 84 Id. at 1076. 
 85 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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Numerous students expressed support for Jane by “writing ‘GP’ or ‘Gay 
Pride’ on their bodies, wearing t-shirts with messages supportive of gay 
rights, yelling ‘Gay Pride’ in the hallways, circulating petitions . . . and 
creating signs.”93 The principal responded with what a federal judge 
later described as a “witch hunt”:94 “He interviewed approximately 
thirty students, interrogated them about their sexual orientations, 
and . . . . instructed students who were homosexual not to discuss their 
sexual orientations.”95 In addition, he prohibited students from 
“wearing rainbow belts or writing ‘Gay Pride’ or ‘GP’ on their arms and 
notebooks,” required them “to wash ‘GP’ or ‘Gay Pride’ from their 
arms,” and “lifted the shirts of female students to verify that no such 
writings were present.”96 After his investigation was complete, he 
suspended eleven students for being involved in what had become 
known as the school’s “Gay Pride” movement, on the ground that they 
belonged to an “illegal organization” that had been forbidden by the 
school board.97 In one instance, he threatened the mother of one lesbian 
girl that he could “send [the girl] off to a private Christian school down 
in Tallahassee,” or to the juvenile detention center, and advised the 
mother that “if there was a man in your house, [and] your children were 
in church, you wouldn’t be having any of these gay issues.”98 
A heterosexual student named Heather Gillman defied the 
principal’s warnings.99 Gillman’s cousin was a lesbian student at the 
same school, and her cousin was among the students whom the 
principal had suspended.100 The following day, Gillman wore a rainbow 
belt and a handmade shirt with the slogan “I Support Gays” to school.101 
She asked the school board for permission to display rainbows, pink 
triangles, and a long list of pro-gay slogans.102 The board replied that 
none of these symbols or slogans could be displayed because they 
indicated membership in an “illegal organization” and were “disruptive 
to the educational process.”103 Gillman sued, claiming that the school 
had violated her freedom of speech by discriminating against her 
viewpoint.104 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1372. 
 95 Id. at 1363. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1363–64. 
 103 Id. at 1364. 
 104 Id. 
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The district court agreed.105 After finding that Gillman prevailed on 
all claims, the judge emphasized that the principal’s conduct “in the 
capacity of a role model and authority figure, is particularly deplorable 
in light of studies which confirm the vulnerability of gay and lesbian 
students.”106 To remedy the violation of Gillman’s First Amendment 
rights, the court permanently enjoined the school from “restraining, 
prohibiting, or suppressing the Plaintiff or any other student . . . from 
expressing their support for the respect, equal treatment, and acceptance 
of gays and lesbians.”107 In addition, the court ordered the school to 
notify all of the school’s students that they “are permitted to express 
their support for the respect, equal treatment, and acceptance of 
homosexuals.”108 
Strictly speaking, the constitutional fate of these claims has not 
been definitively resolved yet, because the Supreme Court has not 
specifically addressed a student’s right to express pro-gay views and 
homosexual feelings in public schools. But for almost forty years, federal 
courts have consistently held that the First Amendment prohibits the 
state from discouraging the expression of pro-gay opinions and 
homosexual desires—even among children—because such a policy is 
tantamount to the suppression of a particular viewpoint. On the same 
day that Healy was decided, the Court explained that viewpoint 
discrimination is the paradigm of what the First Amendment prohibits: 
“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”109 
C.     Equal Protection 
Does the Equal Protection Clause allow the state to specifically 
target children’s homosexual status—to discourage children from being 
or becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual? 
1.     Romer v. Evans: The Anti-Animus Principle 
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a law that 
discriminated based on homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual status on the 
ground that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause.110 The law in 
 
 105 Id. at 1370. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 1379. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 110 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Romer was an amendment to the Colorado Constitution known as 
Amendment 2.111 Titled “No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, 
Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation,” the law provided that “homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships” 
could not serve as a basis for any “claim of discrimination,” among 
other things.112 In effect, the law repealed a number of existing laws that 
had protected lesbian, gay, and bisexual people from discrimination in 
“housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health 
and welfare services,” and it barred any state or municipal entity from 
adopting such laws in the future.113 
In striking down Amendment 2, the Romer Court emphasized the 
law’s singular focus on a particular class, the “[s]weeping and 
comprehensive” effect of the law, and the discontinuity between the 
law’s breadth and the State’s justifications.114 First, the Court explained 
that “the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group,”115 because “[i]t 
identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection 
across the board.”116 Next, the Court reasoned that the law’s “sheer 
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class 
it affects.”117 For these reasons, the Court said, Amendment 2 not only 
“fails” rational basis review, but “defies” and “confounds” it.118 The 
Court explained: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection 
of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”119 Because Amendment 2 was “a 
status-based enactment divorced from any factual context,” the Court 
concluded that it was “a classification of persons undertaken for its own 
sake.”120 Instead of classifying lesbian and gay people “to further a 
proper legislative end,” the law “classifie[d] homosexuals . . . to make 
them unequal to everyone else.”121 
Many scholars have correctly observed that Romer deviates from 
the traditional version of rational basis review in one important 
respect—namely, in determining which kinds of relationships between a 
 
 111 Id. at 623. 
 112 Id. at 624. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 627, 632. 
 115 Id. at 632. 
 116 Id. at 633. 
 117 Id. at 632. 
 118 Id. at 632–33. 
 119 Id. at 634 (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120 Id. at 635. 
 121 Id. 
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law’s classification and the law’s goal qualify as “rational.”122 Yet Romer 
does not vary from the traditional standard in another respect—in 
determining which kinds of interests qualify as “legitimate.” As the 
Romer Court explained, the anti-animus principle that Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 offended was “conventional and venerable.”123 
2.     Romer’s Roots: Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
More than twenty years before Romer was decided, the anti-animus 
principle was first articulated in the 1973 case of United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,124 and it was reaffirmed in the 
1985 case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.125 And just 
this year, the principle was applied in the landmark gay rights case of 
United States v. Windsor.126 By examining how the Court has articulated 
and applied this principle in Moreno, Cleburne, and Windsor, this 
Section explains why the anti-animus principle bars the state from 
invoking an interest in targeting children’s homosexual status—an 
interest in discouraging children from becoming lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual, or encouraging children to become heterosexual. 
In Moreno, the Court invoked the equal protection guarantees of 
the Fifth Amendment to invalidate a law “intended to prevent so-called  
‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp 
program.”127 The Court reasoned that the law “clearly cannot be 
sustained by reference to this congressional purpose,” because “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”128 “[A] purpose to discriminate 
against hippies,” the Court explained, could not justify the law “in and 
of itself . . . without reference to (some independent) considerations in 
the public interest.”129 
 
 122 For this reason, judges and commentators have often interpreted Romer as applying a 
different standard of judicial review, which is often referred to as “rational basis with bite.” See, 
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) 
(claiming that Romer applied “a more searching form of rational basis review”); Jeremy B. 
Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual 
Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2784 (2005) (claiming that Romer applied “rational 
basis [review] with bite”). 
 123 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.  
 124 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 125 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 126 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 127 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 534–35 (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Although the term “independent” was placed within parentheses, 
the Court’s usage of this term is significant, because it helps to pinpoint 
the logical flaw of justifications based on animus. In order to qualify as a 
valid state interest, the law’s objective must be able to stand by itself and 
for itself—wholly independent from the classification that the law has 
enacted. Otherwise, the state’s justification would be self-serving, if not 
circular; it would restate and rely upon the policy’s result in order to 
justify it. By clarifying that the state’s interest must be “independent” in 
order to qualify as “legitimate,” Moreno lays bare a fundamental axiom 
of judicial review. In one form or another, the Supreme Court has 
recognized this principle as a basic requirement of the Constitution’s 
free speech, equal protection, and due process guarantees. The parallel 
to the First Amendment’s prohibition against viewpoint discrimination 
is apparent: Just as a speech-based law cannot be justified by the state’s 
objections to the speaker’s message, a status-based law cannot be 
justified by animus against the targeted class. 
After Moreno, the Court next invoked this constitutional 
prohibition against animus in City of Cleburne, when it invalidated a 
city ordinance that required a special-use permit for “the operation of a 
group home for the mentally retarded.”130 After finding that the zoning 
ordinance was not rationally related to any of “the city’s legitimate 
interests,”131 the Court concluded that the ordinance was based on 
nothing more than “an irrational prejudice against the mentally 
retarded.”132 Quoting Moreno, the Court explained that “some 
objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group’—are not legitimate state interests.”133 
In the course of this analysis, the Cleburne Court rejected one 
particular state interest that sheds light on the anti-animus principle 
elaborated in this line of cases—“the negative attitude of the majority of 
property owners located within 200 feet” of the proposed location for 
the group home.134 As the Court explained, the Equal Protection Clause 
did not permit the city to act upon the public’s “mere negative attitudes, 
or fear,” unsubstantiated by other factors.135 Echoing the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against granting a “heckler’s veto,”136 the 
Court explained: “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but 
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”137 
 
 130 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. 
 131 Id. at 448. 
 132 Id. at 450. 
 133 Id. at 446–47 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
 134 Id. at 448. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 137 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court’s quotation to Palmore v. Sidoti in this context is 
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3.     Romer Redux: United States v. Windsor 
Most recently, in United States v. Windsor, the Court invoked the 
anti-animus principle to invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), a federal law that defined “marriage” as “a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”138 In analyzing 
this law, the Court began by observing that the definition of marriage 
was traditionally a power served to the states, rather than the federal 
government: “By history and tradition the definition and regulation of 
marriage . . . has been treated as being within the authority and realm of 
the separate States.”139 By refusing to recognize the marriages into which 
same-sex couples had lawfully entered, DOMA rejected a long-standing 
tradition in which “the Federal Government . . . has deferred to state-
law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”140 By granting 
the right to marry to same-sex couples, states had sought to confer “a 
dignity and status of immense import” upon a new class of persons; by 
refusing to recognize these marriages under federal law, DOMA sought 
“to injure the same class the State seeks to protect.”141 
Turning to the application of the Fifth Amendment’s “basic due 
process and equal protection principles,”142 the Court invoked two 
versions of the anti-animus principle from Moreno and Romer. Quoting 
Moreno, the Court rehearsed the now-familiar statement that 
discrimination cannot be justified by “a bare congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group.”143 Quoting Romer, the Court 
added that “[i]n determining whether a law is motivated by an improper 
animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ 
especially require careful consideration.”144 In this particular case, the 
Court explained that “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual 
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” was 
 
significant because Palmore involved discrimination based on race, which is subject to strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432–33. In Palmore, the trial 
court had denied a mother custody because she was living with a man of another race. Id. at 
431. The court had reasoned that the child’s best interests would be served by granting custody 
to the father because the child would be taunted and stigmatized for living in an interracial 
household. Id. The Court unanimously rejected this rationale: “The Constitution cannot 
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.” Id. at 433. By applying this principle 
in Cleburne, the Court established that justifications based on “private bias” cannot satisfy any 
standard of judicial review. 
 138 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 139 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–90 (2013). 
 140 Id. at 2691. 
 141 Id. at 2692. 
 142 Id. at 2693. 
 143 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 144 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
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“strong evidence” that the law was based on “disapproval” of same-sex 
couples.145 
Drawing an analogy between DOMA and Colorado’s Amendment 
2, the Windsor Court emphasized that DOMA’s effect was unusually 
broad. Compared to previous definitions of marriage in federal laws, 
“DOMA has a far greater reach; for it enacts a directive applicable to 
over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations.”146 
Because “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code,” 
it constitutes “a system-wide enactment with no identified connection 
to any particular area of federal law.”147 
In contrast to the Court’s cautious rhetoric in previous cases, the 
Windsor Court was not bashful about identifying animus as the law’s 
intended effect. With unusual frequency and candor, the Court 
repeatedly stressed that DOMA’s “purpose and effect” was “to disparage 
and to injure”148 same-sex couples—“to impose a disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma” upon them,149 and to treat the 
marriages into which they had entered as “second-class,”150 “second-
tier,”151 and “less worthy than the marriages of others.”152 As if that were 
not enough, the Court added that the law actually harmed the children 
of same-sex couples, instead of protecting them from homosexual 
influences. In unusually blunt language, the Court found that DOMA 
“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples,”153 and “brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples” 
by raising “the cost of health care for families” and denying “benefits 
allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent.”154 
4.     Animus: The Prevention of Gay People, or a World Without 
Homosexuals 
When the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality is framed in 
terms of children’s homosexual status—as an attempt to encourage 
children to become (or be) heterosexual, or to discourage them from 
becoming (or being) lesbian, gay, or bisexual—it runs afoul of the 
principle articulated in this line of cases. To take one example: In the 
 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. at 2690. 
 147 Id. at 2694. 
 148 Id. at 2696. 
 149 Id. at 2693. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 2694. 
 152 Id. at 2696. 
 153 Id. at 2694. 
 154 Id. at 2695. 
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recent challenge to California’s Proposition 8, a federal court found that 
“[t]he Proposition 8 campaign relied on fears that children exposed to 
the concept of same-sex marriage may become gay or lesbian”155 and 
that “Proposition 8 played on a fear that exposure to homosexuality 
would turn children into homosexuals.”156 
As the trial court in the Prop 8 case seemed to recognize, such 
objections to children becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual are nothing 
more than thinly-veiled objections to the development of more lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual people.157 Because the court found that “sexual 
orientation is not related to an individual’s ability to contribute to 
society or perform in the workplace,” it ruled that “California has no 
interest in asking gays and lesbians to change their sexual orientation or 
in reducing the number of gays and lesbians in California.”158 
This analysis holds true regardless of the context in which the 
objection to homosexuality is articulated, or the particular mechanism 
by which one imagines that homosexuality is transmitted—through 
indoctrination, role modeling, or the rising tide of public approval. 
When objections to children’s homosexuality are articulated in these 
terms, they represent a desire to minimize the number of people who 
become lesbian, gay, and bisexual—and thus, the number of people who 
will someday be lesbian, gay, and bisexual. It is difficult to think of a 
clearer example of animosity toward a class than the simple fear that the 
class will gain additional members—other than the hope that the class 
will lose existing members, which is closely related.159 
To the best of my knowledge, no court has explicitly applied this 
constitutional principle in the context of childhood—i.e., no court has 
held that the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees bar the state 
from relying upon an interest in discouraging children from being or 
 
 155 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., 
Brown v. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 156 Id. at 1003 (emphasis added). 
 157 An analogy may be useful: Suppose Congress passed a law that specifically aimed to 
prevent HIV infection among minors. In theory, one might attack this law as a form of 
discrimination based on HIV status—i.e., a legislative attempt to minimize the number of 
people infected with HIV. Yet in this case, the law could be easily defended on independent 
grounds—namely, that HIV shortens an individual’s life by attacking the immune system, 
rendering the individual vulnerable to common infections. This is precisely what is lacking 
when the state asserts an interest in discouraging children from being or becoming lesbian, gay, 
or bisexual—an independent reason for preventing homosexuality’s spread. 
 158 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159 Cf. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 42 (1990) (arguing that 
“the scope of institutions whose programmatic undertaking is to prevent the development of 
gay people is unimaginably large” and that the nature/nurture debate is characterized by “the 
overarching, hygienic Western fantasy of a world without any more homosexuals in it”). 
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becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual.160 But the constitutional foundations 
for this principle were developed in Nabozny v. Podlesny,161 a Seventh 
Circuit ruling published in the same year as Romer. 
5.     Nabozny v. Podlesny: Romer for Kids 
In Nabozny, the court held that a gay teenager stated a valid claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that school 
administrators had failed to protect him from a relentless campaign of 
bullying.162 In the seventh grade, after Jamie Nabozny came out as gay, 
his classmates subjected him to a mock rape during class, assaulted him 
in a bathroom, urinated on him, and kicked him in the stomach so 
many times that he required surgery for internal bleeding.163 When 
Nabozny reported these incidents to school officials, they took no steps 
to discipline the offending students or protect him from further 
harassment. During middle school, Nabozny’s principal told him that 
“boys will be boys” and that if he was “going to be so openly gay,” then 
he should “expect” such behavior.164 During high school, an assistant 
principal laughed when Nabozny reported this harassment and told 
Nabozny that he deserved it.165 
Nabozny’s victory in the Seventh Circuit was a victory for gay 
people of all ages, but it was a special milestone for gay minors. 
Recounting the facts, the court unhaltingly recognized the gay identity 
of a thirteen-year-old child: “Around the time that Nabozny entered the 
seventh grade, Nabozny realized that he is gay. Many of Nabozny’s 
fellow classmates soon realized it too.”166 Analyzing Nabozny’s equal 
protection claims, the court found that “[t]here can be little doubt that 
homosexuals are an identifiable minority” and “discrimination against 
Nabozny based on his sexual orientation . . . was unlawful . . . . absent at 
least a rational basis for the discrimination.”167 In light of Nabozny’s 
allegations, the court had no trouble finding that “the discriminatory 
treatment was motivated by . . . Nabozny’s sexual orientation.”168 
 
 160 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker came tantalizingly close. See 
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002–03; Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of 
Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 954–55 (2010) (arguing that Judge Walker’s 
opinion lays the foundations for claiming that under Romer, the state has no legitimate interest 
in discouraging children from becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual). 
 161 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 162 Id. at 458. 
 163 Id. at 451–52. 
 164 Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165 Id. at 452. 
 166 Id. at 451. 
 167 Id. at 457. 
 168 Id. 
ROSKY.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/25/2013  1:26 PM 
452 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:425 
Applying rational basis review, the court reasoned, “[w]e are unable to 
garner any rational basis for permitting one student to assault another 
based on the victim’s sexual orientation, and the defendants do not offer 
us one.”169 In rejecting the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the 
court emphasized that the relevant constitutional principles were 
already “well established” and “self-evident” even before Romer was 
decided,170 and moreover, that they had been articulated by the Supreme 
Court “[a]s early as 1886.”171 After the court reinstated Nabozny’s 
claims, a jury found that the school officials were liable for failing to 
protect him.172 Before the jury had a chance to award damages, the 
defendants settled Nabozny’s claims for $900,000—more than three 
times the amount originally sought.173 
Since Nabozny was decided, it has been widely followed by federal 
courts. Similar decisions have been reached by the Ninth Circuit and 
federal district courts in California, Indiana, Ohio, and Minnesota.174 
With the benefit of these rulings, gay students have won settlements 
ranging from $40,000 to $1,100,000 against school districts that have 
failed to protect them from anti-gay bullying.175 Thanks to the Seventh 
Circuit, it is now widely accepted that when a school fails to protect a 
student from harassment because he is lesbian, gay, or bisexual, the 
student can bring a valid claim for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Strictly speaking, however, none of these cases reject the 
promotion of heterosexuality as a justification for a school’s failure to 
 
 169 Id. at 458. 
 170 Id. at 457. 
 171 Id. at 458 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886)). 
 172 See Terry Wilson, Gay-Bashing Victim Awarded $1 Million for School Incident, CHI. TRIB. 
(Nov. 21, 1996), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-11-21/news/9611210032_1_jamie-
nabozny-chicago-public-schools-ashland-school-district; see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, LAMBDA 
LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/nabozny-v-podlesny (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013). 
 173 BIEGEL, supra note 78, at 12; Nabozny v. Podlesny, supra note 172; Wilson, supra note 
172. 
 174 Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); Seiwert v. 
Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Schroeder ex rel. 
Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Massey v. Banning 
Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000); O.H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-99-5123 
JCS, 2000 WL 33376299 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000). In addition, federal courts have recognized 
similar claims brought by gay students under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits 
sex discrimination in federally funded schools. See, e.g., Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 
231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg’l Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 99-448-JD, 
2001 WL 276975 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 
1165 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 175 GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK ET AL., FIFTEEN EXPENSIVE REASONS WHY 
SAFE SCHOOLS LAWS AND POLICIES ARE IN YOUR DISTRICT’S BEST INTERESTS (2013), available 
at http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/15reasons.pdf. 
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protect a student from bullying. When a gay student alleges that school 
officials have failed to protect him, the school does not even attempt to 
justify this alleged failure as any kind of intentional policy or practice. In 
Nabozny, for example, the school officials did not argue that they had 
allowed Nabozny to be bullied in order to keep him in the closet or 
discourage him from becoming gay or bisexual.176 Such explanations 
may well have been honest, but they would surely not have been 
legitimate justifications for failing to protect Nabozny from bullying. 
Regardless of the school’s motives, the irrationality of failing to protect a 
gay student (or indeed, any student) from bullying speaks for itself. 
Yet there is little reason to presume that the principle articulated in 
Nabozny is limited to cases involving a school’s failure to protect a gay 
student from bullying and harassment, or to other such patently 
indefensible practices. Under Romer and Windsor, the state does not 
have any legitimate interest in discouraging children from being lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual, or encouraging them to be heterosexual—not by any 
methods, however implausible, ill-conceived, or banal they may be. The 
desire to discourage children from becoming gay is nothing more than 
an especially old and insidious form of animus against lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people; it is not a legitimate state interest under the 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantees. If discrimination against 
LGBT people is to be justified, then it must be linked to an interest that 
is independent of the state’s desire to encourage children to become 
heterosexual.177 
D.     Due Process 
It is well-settled that the state has broad authority to discourage 
children from engaging in sexual conduct, such as through the 
prohibition of statutory rape, child molestation, and child pornography 
offenses.178 But do the Constitution’s due process guarantees allow the 
state to specifically target children’s homosexual conduct—to specifically 
discourage children from engaging in homosexual relations and 
 
 176 Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458 (“We are unable to garner any rational basis for permitting one 
student to assault another based on the victim’s sexual orientation, and the defendants do not 
offer us one.”). 
 177 For a discussion of whether this policy may be justified on independent grounds, see 
infra Part IV. 
 178 See, e.g., Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding 
statutory rape law); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding law prohibiting the 
distribution of pornography to minors). See generally Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678, 694 n.17 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n the area of sexual mores, as in other areas, the 
scope of permissible state regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults.”). 
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relationships, as opposed to sexual relations and relationships of any 
kind? 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down a law that 
prohibited homosexual sodomy as a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.179 The law in Lawrence was a Texas statute that criminalized 
“deviate sexual intercourse” between persons of the same sex; two men 
had been convicted under the law for engaging in “anal sex” with each 
other.180 
Throughout the proceedings, the men had challenged these 
convictions under both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process 
Clause—as a form of discrimination against gay and lesbian people, and 
as an infringement on an individual’s liberty to engage in homosexual 
relations and relationships.181 To justify the law, Texas argued that it was 
rationally related to “the legitimate governmental interest [in the] 
promotion of morality”182—the same interest that the Supreme Court 
had invoked seventeen years earlier to justify a sodomy law in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.183 
Rather than deciding the case under the Equal Protection Clause—
and thus, leaving the holding of Bowers untouched—the Lawrence 
Court signaled that it was deciding the case under the Due Process 
Clause: “We conclude the case should be resolved by determining 
whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process 
Clause . . . .”184 Analogizing the men’s claim to the liberty interests 
protected in Griswold v. Connecticut,185 Eisenstadt v. Baird,186 Roe v. 
Wade,187 and Carey v. Population Services International,188 the Court 
emphasized that the Texas law sought “to control a personal 
relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.”189 
While the opinion’s standard of review is admittedly vague,190 the 
Court’s rejection of morality as a justification for the law is much 
 
 179 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 180 Id. at 563. 
 181 Id.  
 182 Respondent’s Brief at 42, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102). 
 183 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that under rational basis standard, Georgia sodomy 
statute was justified by “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). 
 184 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 185 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 186 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 187 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 188 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 189 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565–67. 
 190 Compare Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot 
reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by 
traditional rational basis review.”), with Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 
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clearer. After criticizing the “historical grounds relied upon in Bowers,” 
the Court acknowledged that “for centuries there have been powerful 
voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral,” and that “[f]or 
many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep 
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles.”191 The Court 
insisted, however, that “[t]hese considerations do not answer the 
question before us,” because “[t]he issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law.”192 Quoting Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, the Court rejected the State’s moral justifications for the Texas 
sodomy law: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.”193 
Toward the end of the opinion, the Court returned to this subject, 
adopting a more explicit rejection of the State’s interest in promoting 
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct. Quoting one of the 
dissenting opinions from Bowers, the Court flatly rejected the notion 
that a law prohibiting a type of conduct could be justified by reference 
to the majority’s belief that the conduct is immoral: “Our prior cases 
make [this] proposition[] abundantly clear[:] . . . . [T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice . . . .”194 Shortly thereafter, the Court held that 
the statute was not justified by any “legitimate state interest”: “The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”195 
 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Lawrence opinion did not employ fundamental-rights analysis 
and . . . it ultimately applied rational-basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, to the challenged 
statute.”). See generally Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (2004); 
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1555 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). 
 191 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 194 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 195 Id. at 578. Admittedly, federal judges remain divided about whether Lawrence rejected 
public morality as a legitimate state interest in all circumstances, or whether the holding should 
be more narrowly construed. See, e.g., id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
majority’s opinion in Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation” by 
asserting that “the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state 
interest”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“For generations, moral disapproval has been taken as an adequate basis for 
legislation . . . . [b]ut, speaking directly of same-sex preferences, Lawrence ruled that moral 
disapproval alone cannot justify legislation discriminating on this basis.”); Cook v. Gates, 528 
F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Lawrence’s holding can only be squared with the Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgment of morality as a rational basis by concluding that a protected liberty interest 
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More recently, in United States v. Windsor, the Court reaffirmed 
Lawrence’s rejection of moral disapproval as a justification for policies 
that target homosexual conduct.196 Because Windsor involved a 
challenge to a federal statute, it was brought under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Court’s ruling was explicitly 
based on “due process” as well as “equal protection” principles.197 In 
striking down the law, the Court explicitly noted that Congress had 
offered moral justifications for the law—“moral disapproval of 
homosexuality,” “a moral conviction that heterosexuality better 
comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality,” and 
“an interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in 
heterosexual-only marriage laws.”198 Closely tracking the holding of 
Lawrence, the Court again found that “no legitimate purpose overcomes 
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, 
by its marriage laws, sought to protect.”199 
When the objection to children’s homosexuality is framed in terms 
of children’s conduct—as a specific interest in discouraging children 
from engaging in homosexual conduct, rather than a broad interest in 
discouraging children from engaging in sexual conduct of any kind—it 
violates the Court’s rejection of moral disapproval under Lawrence and 
Windsor. Standing by itself, the state’s interest in discouraging 
homosexual conduct is not a legitimate state interest, because it is not 
independent from the state’s or society’s moral objections to the 
conduct itself. If moral disapproval of homosexual conduct is not even a 
legitimate state interest, then it cannot justify policies that specifically 
target that conduct. For these purposes, it does not matter whether the 
state is targeting the homosexual conduct of children or adults. 
In this sense, Lawrence’s rejection of moral disapproval closely 
parallels Romer’s rejection of animus against lesbian and gay people,200 
as well as the First Amendment’s rejection of the heckler’s veto in cases 
involving gay students.201 Writing separately in Lawrence, Justice 
 
was at stake, and therefore a rational basis for the law was not sufficient.” (emphasis added)); 
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 & n.33 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that under 
Lawrence, “public morality cannot justify a law that regulates an individual’s private sexual 
conduct and does not relate to prostitution, the potential for injury or coercion, or public 
conduct”); Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that “public 
morality survives as a rational basis for legislation even after Lawrence”). 
 196 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 197 Id.; see Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219 (2013) 
(arguing that “if we look more closely at Windsor, we see that it is conceptually, if not 
doctrinally, a right-to-marry case”). 
 198 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 
2920) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199 Id. at 2696 (emphasis added). 
 200 See supra Part I.C.1. 
 201 See supra note 76 and corresponding text.  
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O’Connor aptly described the fallacy of moral justifications for sodomy 
laws: “Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state 
interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize 
homosexual sodomy.”202 When the state prohibits a particular kind of 
conduct, it cannot justify this policy by invoking “moral disapproval” of 
that conduct, because that justification is so self-serving as to be 
effectively circular. It is as if the people of Texas were saying, “it’s a 
crime because we don’t like it” or worse still, “it’s a crime because we 
said so.” It is legislation by fiat, a classic case of governing by ipse dixit. 
One year after Lawrence was decided, the Kansas Supreme Court 
applied this principle to minors in State v. Limon, a case involving a 
teenager’s homosexual conduct.203 In this case, a gay teenager named 
Matthew Limon had been convicted for engaging in “consensual oral 
contact with the genitalia” of another teenager under the Kansas 
sodomy law.204 At the time of the incident, Limon was eighteen years 
old, and his partner M.A.R. was fifteen years old.205 Limon argued that 
he should have been charged under the State’s unlawful voluntary sexual 
relations law, rather than the State’s sodomy law.206 This other statute, 
commonly referred to as the “Romeo and Juliet” law, provided lighter 
penalties for teenagers who engaged in consensual intercourse, sodomy, 
or lewd touching.207 Unfortunately for Limon, however, the Romeo and 
Juliet law applied only when “the victim and offender are members of 
the opposite sex.”208 Because Limon and M.A.R. were both male, 
Limon’s conduct did not fall within the provisions of the Romeo and 
Juliet law. 
After a bench trial, Limon was sentenced to a prison term of 206 
months, a parole term of sixty months, and required to register as a 
“persistent sexual offender.”209 If Limon or M.A.R. had been female, 
Limon would have received a sentence of only thirteen to fifteen months 
and would not have been required to register as a sex offender.210 
To defend this disparity in punishment, the State argued that the 
law was justified by the State’s interest in “the protection and 
preservation of the traditional sexual mores of society”—an apparent 
reference to the public’s moral disapproval of homosexual conduct.211 
 
 202 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 203 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 204 Id. at 24. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-3522 (repealed 2010)). 
 209 Id. at 25. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 33; see also Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 12, Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (No. 00-
85898-S) (arguing that the Romeo and Juliet law “is rationally related to the State’s legitimate 
power to protect not only its children, but to protect its inherent view of public morality”). 
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Applying rational basis review, the Kansas Supreme Court held that this 
interest could not justify Limon’s sentence because “[t]he Lawrence 
decision rejected a morality-based rationale as a legitimate State 
interest.”212 
II.     WHAT WINDSOR WROUGHT: UNLIMITING ROMER AND LAWRENCE 
In the years since Romer and Lawrence were decided, lower courts 
have been divided about how broadly these rulings should be 
interpreted. To limit Romer’s rejection of animus, courts have 
emphasized that Colorado Amendment 2 was “sweeping and 
comprehensive” and that the law’s breadth figured prominently in the 
Court’s conclusion that it lacked any rational basis.213 To limit 
Lawrence’s rejection of moral disapproval, courts have observed that the 
Texas sodomy statute was a criminal law and that the opinion 
concluded with a cautionary list of factual scenarios that “the present 
case does not involve.”214 
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family 
Services, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Romer and Lawrence on 
both of these grounds, in the course of upholding a Florida law that 
prohibited any “homosexual” from adopting children based on the “vital 
role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender 
identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”215 While the 
adoption law was later invalidated in state court proceedings,216 Lofton 
remains the leading federal opinion on whether states may 
 
 212 Limon, 122 P.3d at 34. 
 213 See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(distinguishing Colorado’s Amendment 2 from an amendment to Nebraska Constitution 
banning the recognition of same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships); 
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(distinguishing Colorado’s Amendment 2 from municipal charter amendment banning the 
adoption of antidiscrimination protections). 
 214 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see, e.g., Bruning, 455 F.3d at 868 n.3 (“The 
Lawrence majority . . . was careful to note that the Texas statute at issue ‘does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.’” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 
(N.J. 2006) (“The Lawrence Court . . . pointedly noted that the case did ‘not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.’” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 979 (Wash. 
2006) (“[T]he [Lawrence] Court specifically said the case ‘does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.’” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); see also L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So.2d 942, 946 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2004) (arguing that Lawrence does not apply to custody determinations because 
“Lawrence addressed the application of a criminal law”). 
 215 358 F.3d 804, 817–18, 826–27 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 216 Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010). 
ROSKY.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/25/2013  1:26 PM 
2013] N O  PRO MO  H E T E RO  459 
constitutionally prohibit lesbian and gay people from adopting.217 Given 
that the ruling rested on the state’s interest in promoting heterosexuality 
during childhood—by providing children with “heterosexual role 
model[s]”218—it is worth considering the doctrinal distinctions on 
which Lofton relies. This Part argues that both of these distinctions lack 
merit, and in any event, they cannot survive the Supreme Court’s recent 
ruling in Windsor. 
A.     Unlimiting Romer 
To distinguish Lofton from Romer, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned 
that “unlike Colorado’s Amendment 2,” Florida’s law was “not so 
‘[s]weeping and comprehensive’ as to render Florida’s rationales for the 
statute ‘inexplicable by anything but animus’ toward its homosexual 
residents.”219 In contrast to Colorado’s law, the court explained, “the 
Florida classification is limited to the narrow and discrete context 
of . . . adoption and, more importantly, has a plausible connection with 
the state’s asserted interest.”220 In particular, the court found that the 
law’s prohibition against “homosexual” persons adopting children was 
rationally related to the State’s concerns about “the influence of 
environmental factors in forming patterns of sexual behavior and the 
importance of heterosexual role models.”221 Read in this manner, Romer 
would be a poor bulwark against the state’s interest in promoting 
heterosexuality among children, which has been invoked to justify a 
wide range of policies that discriminate against LGBT people. 
For present purposes, however, the breadth of Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 is a red herring. Whatever merits the Lofton court’s 
distinction may otherwise have in other contexts,222 the distinction does 
nothing to legitimize the state’s interest “in shaping sexual and gender 
identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”223 Even if 
Colorado’s law was broader than Florida’s, that does not transform the 
 
 217 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE 
LAW 742 (4th ed. 2011). 
 218 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
 219 Id. at 826 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627, 632 (1996)). 
 220 Id. (footnote omitted).  
 221 Id. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 222 Although the merits of this distinction are not logically relevant to my argument, I do not 
mean to concede them by passing over them here. In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed sharply with the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1081 
(9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(“Proposition 8 is no less problematic than Amendment 2 merely because its effect is narrower; 
to the contrary, the surgical precision with which it excises a right belonging to gay and lesbian 
couples makes it even more suspect.”). Moreover, as I argue below, the Lofton court’s reading of 
Romer was eviscerated by Windsor. See infra Part II.C. 
 223 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. 
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promotion of heterosexuality into a legitimate state interest. When this 
interest is couched in terms of children’s “sexual and gender identity,”224 
it is nothing more than an animus against the targeted class—an attempt 
to limit the number of children who grow up to be lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual, while increasing the number of children who grow up to be 
heterosexual.225 Even under a narrow reading of Romer, there is little 
reason to think that the state has a legitimate interest “in shaping sexual 
and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”226 
B.     Unlimiting Lawrence 
To distinguish Lofton from Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit quoted 
the Lawrence Court’s warning that “[t]he present case does not involve 
minors.”227 This statement appeared in the penultimate paragraph of the 
Lawrence opinion, immediately after the Court announced that “Bowers 
v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled”: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.228 
To sharpen the contrast between minors and adults, the Lawrence Court 
then explained: “The case does involve two adults who, with full and 
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common 
to a homosexual lifestyle.”229 
In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the plaintiff’s challenge to Florida’s 
adoption law involved “not only consenting adults, but minors as well” 
 
 224 Id. (emphasis added). 
 225 See supra Part I.C.4. 
 226 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818; see supra Part I.C.4.  
 227 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 (emphasis added) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 
(2003)). 
 228 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 229 Id. (emphasis added). Throughout the opinion, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the 
case involved adults. See id. at 564 (“The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged 
offense.” (emphasis added)); id. (“We conclude the case should be resolved by determining 
whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of 
their liberty under the Due Process Clause . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 567 (“[A]dults may 
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives 
and still retain their dignity as free persons.” (emphasis added)); id. at 569 (“Laws prohibiting 
sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 572 (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” (emphasis added)); id. 
at 576 (“Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected 
right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
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and was distinguishable from Lawrence on this ground.230 But this is a 
strained reading of the Lawrence Court’s disclaimer that “[t]he present 
case does not involve minors.”231 Given the sexual nature of the Texas 
sodomy law—and indeed, the sexual nature of all the other examples on 
the Lawrence Court’s list—it seems fairly clear that the Court meant to 
distinguish the Texas sodomy law from laws that govern sexual relations 
with minors. 
The most obvious examples of such laws would be prohibitions 
against statutory rape, child sexual abuse, child pornography, and 
perhaps the distribution of pornography to minors. Given that all of the 
examples on the list involved sexual conduct, it seems doubtful that the 
Court meant to distinguish sodomy laws from other policies that 
“involve minors” only in a much broader sense, such as adoption and 
foster care statutes, custody and visitation standards, or presumably the 
employment of teachers, coaches, and other role models. Earlier in the 
opinion, the Court had warmly suggested that homosexual conduct “can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”232 and 
had bemoaned that sodomy laws had served as “an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the 
private spheres.”233 In light of the benevolent attitude toward 
homosexuality betrayed in these passages, it beggars belief to suppose 
that when the Court observed that “[t]he present case does not involve 
minors,”234 it meant to juxtapose gay parents with statutory rapists and 
child molesters. 
 
 230 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817. 
 231 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 232 Id. at 567. Dissenting from Lawrence, Justice Scalia makes a similar observation about the 
majority’s tone, and the likely implications of the majority’s analysis in subsequent cases: 
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for 
purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all 
pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring”; what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of 
marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the 
Constitution”? . . . This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage 
only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the 
decisions of this Court. 
Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting id. at 567, 578). 
 233 Id. at 575 (majority opinion).  
 234 Id. at 578. 
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C.     What Windsor Wrought 
In any event, the Eleventh Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Florida’s 
adoption ban from the laws challenged in Romer and Lawrence is not 
likely to survive the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Windsor. In 
striking down DOMA, the Court emphatically declared that the law was 
based on nothing more than “improper animus”—indeed, a desire to 
“injure” same-sex couples by imposing a “stigma” upon them—and 
explicitly rejected Congress’s attempts to offer “moral” justifications for 
the law.235 
If the Supreme Court had been inclined to read Romer and 
Lawrence narrowly in Windsor—as applying only to laws as broad as 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, or as intrusive as Texas’s sodomy law—it 
could have attempted to do so.236 Although DOMA touched upon more 
than 1,000 federal laws, it was concerned only with the federal 
recognition of marriages—not with discrimination in “housing, 
employment, education, public accommodations, and health and 
welfare services,” like Colorado’s Amendment 2, which implicated an 
“almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors.”237 And by 
defining marriage exclusively as “a legal union between one man and 
one woman,”238 DOMA squarely addressed one of the issues that the 
Lawrence Court had carefully sidestepped—“whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”239 
To be sure, Windsor included a fair share of limiting language, 
much like Romer and Lawrence. For several pages, the majority’s 
opinion emphasized that prior to DOMA, the power to define marriage 
had traditionally been reserved to the states.240 Whenever possible, the 
majority noted that DOMA was designed to “injure” marriages that the 
states had legally recognized,241 and moreover, that the law sought to 
 
 235 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 236 Of course, by saying that the Windsor Court could have “attempted” to distinguish 
Romer and Lawrence, I do not mean to suggest that the distinctions are valid. On the contrary, I 
mean to argue that the Lofton Court’s narrow reading of Romer and Lawrence was 
unprincipled. 
 237 Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694, with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 631 (1996). 
As the Windsor Court implied, however, DOMA’s effect was much broader than this contrast 
suggests. Although Windsor involved a challenge to the application of the federal estate tax, the 
Court correctly noted that DOMA controlled a vast range of laws, including “laws pertaining to 
Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.” Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 238 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 239 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 240 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–92. 
 241 Id. at 2692, 2693, 2696. 
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“influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage 
laws.”242 More than once, the Court suggested this federal intrusion into 
the domain of marriage law was “unusual,”243 and that 
“[d]iscriminations of an unusual character”244 were especially relevant 
“[i]n determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus.”245 
In the penultimate paragraph, the majority stressed that DOMA was 
directed at the class of “persons who are joined in same-sex marriages 
made lawful by the State,”246 and cautioned that “[t]his opinion and its 
holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”247 
In a pair of dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Scalia offered opposing viewpoints on whether the majority’s 
disclaimers about federalism should be taken seriously. On the one 
hand, Chief Justice Roberts claimed that the majority’s judgment was 
“based on federalism,”248 and he emphasized that the majority’s analysis 
“leads no further.”249 Justice Scalia, by contrast, reminded readers that 
he had been a member of the Court when Romer and Lawrence were 
decided, and he had heard “such ‘bald, unreasoned disclaimer[s]’ 
before”250 in both cases. Dissenting from Lawrence, he had predicted 
that “[i]f moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate 
state interest,’” then the state would not be able to offer any justification 
“for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples.”251 Now 
that his prediction had come to pass, he added that “no one should be 
fooled” about what Windsor wrought:252 In a challenge to state laws 
against same-sex marriage, he predicted, “[h]ow easy it is, indeed how 
inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws 
denying same-sex couples marital status.”253 
While this debate about Windsor’s scope may one day decide the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, it does nothing to rescue 
the state’s interest “in shaping sexual and gender identity and in 
providing heterosexual role modeling.”254 Whatever Windsor portends 
about the constitutionality of state laws against same-sex marriage, it 
 
 242 Id. at 2693 (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 
12–13 (1st Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 243 Id. at 2692–93. 
 244 Id. at 2693 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 245 Id.  
 246 Id. at 2695. 
 247 Id. at 2696. 
 248 Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 249 Id. at 2696. 
 250 Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 251 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 252 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 253 Id. at 2709. 
 254 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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emphatically reaffirms the “basic due process and equal protection 
principles” articulated in Romer and Lawrence: Under the Constitution’s 
equal protection guarantees, a law may not be based on “animus” 
against lesbian, gay, or bisexual people; under the Constitution’s due 
process protections, a law may not be based on “moral disapproval” of 
homosexual conduct. When the state’s interest “in shaping sexual and 
gender identity” is framed in terms of children’s status or conduct, it 
runs afoul of these basic principles of equal protection and due process. 
III.     CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLATIONS: DEFENDING CHILDREN’S CONDUCT 
AS SPEECH, STATUS, AND CONDUCT 
The Court’s caveat that Lawrence did not “involve minors” begs a 
set of more vexing questions about the state’s regulation of 
homosexuality in childhood: If the state may broadly discourage 
children from engaging in sexual conduct, then may it specifically 
discourage children from engaging in homosexual conduct? Does the 
existence of the greater power entail the existence of a lesser power, 
which is more specific? If not, why not? Whether or not children have a 
broad liberty to engage in sexual conduct, might they still have an equal 
liberty to choose between homosexual and heterosexual conduct? Even 
though Lawrence did not “involve minors,” does the Constitution offer 
any protections for children’s liberty to engage in homosexual conduct 
at all? 
These questions are not idle. They have been addressed by federal 
courts in First Amendment challenges brought by lesbian and gay high 
school students, and in State v. Limon,255 they were squarely posed to 
the Kansas Supreme Court. This Part examines three distinct ways to 
defend children’s homosexual conduct against policies that specifically 
target it—as a form of speech, a proxy for status, and a type of conduct. 
Each of these claims is constitutionally valid and merits attention from 
scholars, lawyers, and activists. They reinforce one another, but they are 
not redundant, because they protect independent aspects of liberty and 
equality in children’s lives. When all three of these claims are placed 
alongside each other, they offer a withering critique of the state’s interest 
in targeting children’s homosexual conduct and a broad foundation for 
children’s right to be queer. 
 
 255 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
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A.     First Amendment: Conduct as Speech 
It is well-settled that the First Amendment protects “symbolic 
speech” or “communicative conduct.”256 In Spence v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court held that conduct is “communicative” when it is 
intended to convey a message and the message is likely to be understood 
by others.257 In United States v. O’Brien, the Court established that 
restrictions on communicative conduct must be justified by an 
“important governmental interest” that is “unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression,” and that restrictions on communicative conduct 
must be “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”258 
The seminal case that applies the First Amendment to children’s 
homosexual conduct is Fricke v. Lynch, a 1980 case involving a gay high 
school student’s request to bring a male date to his senior prom in 
Rhode Island.259 When Aaron Fricke’s request was refused by the 
school’s principal, Richard Lynch, Fricke filed suit in federal court, 
alleging that the principal’s decision had violated his First Amendment 
rights.260 
Applying the O’Brien standard, the district court began by finding 
that the act of attending the prom with another male was conduct that 
had “significant expressive content.”261 To support this finding, the 
court cited Fricke’s testimony that “he wants to go because he feels he 
has a right to attend and participate just like all the other students and 
that it would be dishonest to his own sexual identity to take a girl to the 
dance.”262 In addition, the court noted, “he feels his attendance would 
have a certain political element and would be a statement for equal 
rights and human rights.”263 Although the court admitted that Fricke’s 
“explanation of his ‘message’ was hesitant,” it emphasized that “he [was] 
sincerely although perhaps not irrevocably committed to a homosexual 
orientation and that attending the dance with another young man 
would be a political statement.”264 
Turning to the principal’s reasons for refusing Fricke’s request, the 
court found that Lynch’s action was not based on “his personal views on 
 
 256 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1097–
1120 (4th ed. 2011). 
 257 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 258 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 259 491 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.R.I. 1980). 
 260 Id. at 382–83. 
 261 Id. at 384. 
 262 Id. at 385. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
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homosexuality.”265 If Lynch had denied Fricke’s request based on his 
disapproval of homosexual conduct, his decision would have violated 
O’Brien’s requirement that the state’s interest must be “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression.”266 As the court explained, O’Brien 
prohibited the school from relying on any interest “in squelching a 
particular message because it objects to its content.”267 
Instead, the court found that the principal had acted based on his 
sincere belief that there was “a significant possibility that some students 
will attempt to injure Aaron and [his date] Paul.”268 However, the court 
refused to accept the legitimacy of this interest, because it was 
tantamount to “suppressing certain speech activity because of the 
reaction its message may engender.”269 In addition to finding that “the 
school can take appropriate security measures to control the risk,”270 the 
court held that the principal had acted based upon “an undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance” in violation of Tinker.271 “To rule 
otherwise,” the court explained, “would completely subvert free speech 
in the schools by granting other students a ‘heckler’s veto,’ allowing 
them to decide through prohibited and violent methods what speech 
will be heard.”272 
Needless to say, a minor’s right to engage in sexually expressive 
conduct is not without limits, especially when the minor’s conduct takes 
place at school. Although the Supreme Court has been solicitous of a 
student’s freedom to express political viewpoints, it has been more 
reluctant to protect student speech that includes sexual content.273 In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld a student’s 
suspension for giving a speech filled with sexual innuendo at an 
assembly of students.274 Distinguishing Tinker, the Court emphasized 
that “it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to 
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”275 
Similarly, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court upheld a 
principal’s refusal to print two articles in a student newspaper, based 
upon the principal’s concern that “the article’s references to sexual 
 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. at 384. 
 269 Id. at 385. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 387 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 272 Id. 
 273 Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (rejecting claim that a law prohibiting the 
sale of “girlie” magazines to minors less than 17 years old violated a minor’s right to “free 
expression” under the First Amendment). 
 274 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 275 Id. at 683. 
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activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger 
students at the school.”276 
In Nguon v. Wolf, a federal district court in California applied 
Tinker and Hazelwood to the novel question of whether the First 
Amendment protects a lesbian student’s right to engage in public 
displays of affection during school.277 In this case, Charlene Nguon was 
a junior at Santiago High School in Garden Grove, California.278 She 
claimed that the school had violated her rights under the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause by disciplining her for 
engaging in “inappropriate public displays of affection” (IPDA) with her 
girlfriend, while ignoring heterosexual couples who had been engaging 
in similar conduct.279 
The court began by recognizing that Tinker protects a student’s 
“right to express his or her sexuality,” relying on cases like Fricke, Boyd, 
and Henkle, which involved gay students attending proms, forming 
organizations, and wearing pro-gay buttons.280 Because Nguon’s “on-
campus public displays of affection . . . were intended to express [her] 
gay sexual orientation,” the court reasoned that they were a form of 
expressive conduct.281 The court observed, however, that the school’s 
regulation of sexual expression was “not limited to the formulation in 
Tinker.”282 Under Hazelwood, “[a] school need not tolerate student 
speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though 
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”283 
Turning to Nguon’s allegations, the court observed that Nguon and 
her girlfriend had never been disciplined for engaging in modest 
affectionate displays, such as sharing a “morning kiss,” “holding hands 
at lunch, pecks on the cheek, short hugs, or sitting in each other’s 
laps.”284 Given that they had regularly engaged in such conduct—and 
 
 276 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988). One of the articles described “three Hazelwood East students’ 
experiences with pregnancy,” and the other discussed “the impact of divorce on students at the 
school.” Id. To justify his decision, the principal expressed concerns that the pregnant students 
might be “identifiable,” in addition to his concern that the story was “inappropriate.” Id. After 
finding that the newspaper was created to serve as “a supervised learning experience for 
journalism students”—that is, a nonpublic forum—the Court held that “school officials were 
entitled to regulate the contents of [the newspaper] in any reasonable manner.” Id. at 270. 
 277 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 278 Id. at 1179. 
 279 Id. at 1181–86. 
 280 Id. at 1188 (citing Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Ed., 258 F. Supp. 
2d 667, 690 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1076 (D. Nev. 2001); 
Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 385–86 (D.R.I. 1980)). For a discussion of Boyd and Henkle, 
see supra Part I.B. 
 281 Nguon, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.  
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 284 Id. at 1189. 
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moreover, that this conduct “surely expressed their sexual 
orientation”—the court found that the school had not “sought to 
eradicate expressions of sexuality, or even expressions of gay sexuality” 
altogether.285 
Instead, the court found that Nguon and her girlfriend had been 
disciplined only for more overtly sexual displays, such as “French 
kissing, making out, and groping” each other.286 Although the court 
hinted that such conduct “may be appropriate on a spring afternoon in a 
public park,”287 it found that the school was allowed to prohibit such 
conduct on campus under Hazelwood: “IPDA is inconsistent with the 
mission of a school, and . . . may be legitimately regulated by school 
official[s] consistent with students’ First Amendment rights.”288 
In response to Nguon’s claim that the school’s IPDA policy was 
enforced in a discriminatory manner, the court found that this 
allegation was belied by the record: “[T]he School Defendants neither 
disciplined on a discriminatory basis nor did they engage in deliberate 
indifference with regard to IPDA engaged in by heterosexual 
couples.”289 Based on this factual finding, the court concluded that the 
school had not discriminated against Charlene based on her sexual 
orientation or her viewpoint.290 Throughout this analysis, the court took 
for granted that any discrimination against lesbian and gay students 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause—and similarly, that any 
discrimination against the display of same-sex affections would violate 
the First Amendment. 
In considering Nguon’s claims, the court emphasized that a 
student’s right to engage in sexual conduct was not unlimited, because 
“not all conduct with a sexual component is necessarily protected 
expressive conduct.”291 Relying on a line of cases denying First 
Amendment protections to public sex acts, the court opined, “[h]aving 
sex, without more, is not expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.”292 Although the court acknowledged that “French kissing, 
making out, and groping . . . . obviously fall short of having sex,”293 it 
noted that such conduct was “far more explicit” than the types of 
expressive conduct that courts had protected in previous cases— 
wearing pro-gay buttons, establishing GSAs, and attending dances with 
 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 1190. 
 288 Id. at 1189. 
 289 Id. at 1187. 
 290 Id. at 1188, 1190–91. 
 291 Id. at 1189. 
 292 Id. (quoting 832 Corp. v. Gloucester Twp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626 (D.N.J. 2005)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 293 Id. 
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same-sex partners.294 Proceeding from the assumption that “French 
kissing, making out, and groping are . . . expressive conduct,” the court 
found that such conduct was “inconsistent with the mission of the 
school.”295 
Without resolving the extent of a student’s “right to express his or 
her sexuality”296 by engaging in sexual conduct, Nguon established that 
public schools must apply limitations on this right in a neutral manner. 
Even if a school were permitted to totally bar students from expressing 
any “sexuality” on campus, it could not privilege the expression of one 
sexuality over another. 
B.     Equal Protection: Conduct as Status 
In State v. Limon, the Kansas Supreme Court was asked to consider 
whether the State could discourage children from engaging in even 
more explicit forms of homosexual conduct—sodomy and lewd 
touching.297 To appreciate the complex interplay between equal 
protection and due process in Limon, it is helpful to understand the 
procedural chronology of Limon and Lawrence. 
When Matthew Limon first appealed his sentence, Lawrence had 
not yet been decided, so the Kansas sodomy law was still valid under 
Bowers v. Hardwick.298 Rather than challenging his conviction as a 
deprivation of due process, Limon challenged his sentence as a denial of 
equal protection.299 Relying on the broad equal protection guarantees of 
the Kansas Constitution and Bill of Rights,300 he argued that by 
punishing homosexual conduct more harshly than heterosexual 
conduct, the State was discriminating against “homosexual 
teenagers,”301 and indeed, all “homosexuals.”302 In effect, he tried to 
litigate “around” the Supreme Court’s holding in Bowers by recasting 
the law’s prohibition of homosexual conduct as a form of discrimination 
based on homosexual status.303 
 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 1190. 
 296 Id. at 1188. 
 297 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 298 Id. at 25 (citing State v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished table 
opinion)). 
 299 Brief of Appellant at 1, State v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (No. 00-85898-
A). 
 300 See id. at 1, 4. 
 301 Id. at 12, 31. 
 302 Id. at 11–31. Arguing in the alternative, Limon claimed that “homosexuals” were a 
“suspect,” “quasi-suspect,” or at least “an identifiable class of Kansans” under the Kansas Bill of 
Rights, and that the disparity in Limon’s punishment could not satisfy “strict scrutiny,” 
“intermediate scrutiny,” or even “rational basis review.” Id. 
 303 Cain, supra note 27, at 1617–21. 
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In his first appeal, this strategy was not successful. The Kansas 
Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence, relying on the continuing 
validity of Bowers.304 When the Kansas Supreme Court denied review, 
Limon appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.305 While his petition was 
pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence.306 The following 
day, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Limon’s petition for certiorari, 
vacated the judgment against him, and remanded to the Kansas Court of 
Appeals “for further consideration in light of Lawrence.”307 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s instructions, one might have 
expected Limon to challenge his sentence under Lawrence as well as 
Romer—as a violation of due process, as well as equal protection. But in 
his second appeal, Limon stuck to his guns: He reiterated his claim that 
the law discriminated against “gay teenagers” without any rational basis, 
in violation of Romer.308 This time around, he added that his equal 
protection claim was now bolstered by the Lawrence Court’s recent 
rejection of “moral disapproval” as a justification for sodomy laws.309 
But rather than supplementing his equal protection claim with a due 
process claim, he emphasized that the law “has nothing to do with 
punishing specific conduct and everything to do with punishing a 
specific group of people—gay teenagers.”310 
As Limon acknowledged in his brief, this argument closely 
paralleled the reasoning that Justice O’Connor had adopted in 
Lawrence.311 Concurring only in the majority’s judgment, Justice 
O’Connor would have invalidated the Texas sodomy law under the 
Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.312 Relying 
principally on Romer, she explained: “Moral disapproval of this group, 
like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to 
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”313 
Although Texas had claimed that the law discriminated “only against 
homosexual conduct” and not “against homosexual persons,”314 Justice 
O’Connor claimed that this distinction did not make any constitutional 
 
 304 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 25 (Kan. 2005) (citing Limon, 41 P.3d 303). 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 307 Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 308 Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on Review at 2–5, Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (No. 
00-85898-S). Limon initially made his equal protection argument before the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, which rejected it, affirming his conviction once again. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). Limon then made the equal protection 
argument before the Kansas Supreme Court. Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on 
Review, supra. 
 309 Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on Review, supra note 308, at 5–6. 
 310 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 311 Id. at 7. 
 312 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 313 Id. at 582. 
 314 Id. at 583 (emphasis added). 
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difference: “While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the 
conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with 
being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is 
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons 
as a class.”315 Based on this conflation of conduct with status,316 Justice 
O’Connor concluded the Texas sodomy law was based on “[m]oral 
disapproval of a group”—rather than moral disapproval of conduct—
which “cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”317 Quoting liberally from Romer, she concluded that 
“[t]he Texas sodomy law ‘raise[s] the inevitable inference that the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons 
affected.’”318 
Strictly speaking, Justice O’Connor stood alone in adopting this 
analytical framework. In Lawrence, the majority voted to strike down 
the Texas law under the Due Process Clause, not the Equal Protection 
Clause.319 In dicta, however, the Court paused briefly to discuss Justice 
O’Connor’s “alternative argument” that the law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.320 After acknowledging that this was “a tenable 
argument” and recognizing that equal protection and due process “are 
linked in important respects,”321 the Court subtly signaled that it was 
not impressed by the State’s proposed distinction between conduct and 
status: “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the 
private spheres.”322 
Ignoring these cues, the Kansas Court of Appeals rejected Limon’s 
claim that the law targeted “gay teenagers.”323 The two-judge majority 
wrote separate opinions, but both judges found that Limon’s case was 
“factually and legally distinguishable” from Lawrence.324 Factually, the 
judges noted that Lawrence involved sexual activity between two adults, 
while Limon’s case involved sexual activity performed on a minor.325 As 
one judge observed, the Lawrence Court had emphasized the distinction 
 
 315 Id. 
 316 See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from 
Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 461–65 (2012) (discussing the “conduct-status 
conflation”). 
 317 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). 
 318 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
 319 Id. at 564 (majority opinion). 
 320 See id. at 574. 
 321 Id. at 574–75. 
 322 Id. at 575 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted that the “continuance [of 
Bowers] as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.” Id. 
 323 State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 235 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 324 Id. at 234; see id. at 241 (Malone, J., concurring). 
 325 Id. at 234 (majority opinion); id. at 241 (Malone, J., concurring). 
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between “minors” and “adults” in the opinion itself.326 Legally, the 
judges noted that the Lawrence majority had struck down the Texas 
statute under the Due Process Clause, whereas Limon was challenging 
the Kansas statute under the Equal Protection Clause.327 Finally, both 
judges suggested that the law was targeting Limon’s homosexual 
conduct rather than his status as a gay teenager. One judge objected that 
Limon had labeled his victim “homosexual or bisexual”; this was 
“unfair,” the judge reasoned, because the two boys had “only one same-
sex encounter” and the victim “might have become confused.”328 The 
other judge agreed that “at this age a child’s sexual orientation is more 
than likely not fully developed.”329 
On appeal, by contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court embraced 
Limon’s conflation of conduct with status, invalidating the Romeo and 
Juliet law under the Equal Protection Clause.330 Although Kansas had 
argued that the law “applies only to conduct and does not discriminate 
against . . . homosexual persons,” the court reasoned that criminalizing 
homosexual conduct was tantamount to targeting lesbian and gay 
people as a class.331 The court recognized that Lawrence involved adults, 
but insisted that “the demeaning and stigmatizing effect upon which the 
Lawrence Court focused is at least equally applicable to teenagers,” if not 
more so.332 With respect to the distinction between due process and 
equal protection, the court noted that “the Lawrence 
majority . . . signaled application of the principles to equal protection 
analysis” by indicating that the two doctrines were “linked in important 
respects.”333 
Subsequent cases have only shored up Limon’s conflation of 
conduct with status. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,334 this 
framework was explicitly embraced by a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In this case, University of California’s Hastings Law School had 
denied official recognition to a group of Christian law students because 
they had refused to admit “anyone who engages in ‘unrepentant 
homosexual conduct,’” in violation of the school’s rule that student 
organizations must remain open to all students.335 When the group 
contended that “it does not exclude individuals because of sexual 
 
 326 Id. at 234 (majority opinion) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
 327 Id.; id. at 241 (Malone, J., concurring). 
 328 Id. at 236 (majority opinion). 
 329 Id. at 242 (Malone, J., concurring). 
 330 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 331 Id. at 28–29. 
 332 Id. at 29. 
 333 Id. at 34 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 334 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 335 Id. at 2979–80. 
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orientation, but rather on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the 
belief that the conduct is not wrong,” the Court responded that this 
distinction was constitutionally meaningless.336 “Our decisions have 
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context,” the 
Court observed.337 In support of this principle, the Court cited the 
Lawrence majority’s subtle observation that criminalizing “homosexual 
conduct” was an invitation to discriminate against “homosexual 
persons,”338 as well as Justice O’Connor’s explicit claim that prohibiting 
“conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual” is equivalent 
to targeting “gay persons as a class.”339 
C.     Due Process: Conduct as Conduct 
Even aside from the Martinez Court’s stamp of approval, the 
conduct/status conflation has much to commend it. After all, it is surely 
correct that homosexual conduct is “closely correlated” with 
homosexual status and that the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty and 
equality guarantees are “linked in important respects.”340 In light of 
these connections, there is little reason to doubt that linking conduct to 
status permits advocates to honestly and powerfully articulate the 
interests and injuries of lesbian and gay people in constitutional 
terms.341 If Matthew Limon identified himself as a “gay teenager,”342 for 
example, then lawyers should be willing to represent him, and judges 
should be willing to recognize him, in such terms. Moreover, if Limon 
identified himself as a gay teenager, then there is no question that he 
was “stigmatiz[ed]” and “demean[ed]” by the disparity in the Romeo 
and Juliet law.343 Justice O’Connor is correct: When the law targets 
 
 336 Id. at 2990 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 337 Id. 
 338 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 339 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 340 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (majority opinion); id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment). On the connections between the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause, see Tribe, supra note 190, at 1898, 1902–16; Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2011). 
 341 As Professor Michael Boucai observes, the same logic may not apply to bisexuals, 
depending on how the conduct/status conflation is articulated. See Boucai, supra note 316, at 
461–64 (observing that “[a]s presently articulated [in same-sex marriage cases], the conduct-
status equation excludes bisexuals,” but insisting that “it is perfectly coherent—and legally 
accurate—to insist that a law that discriminates against homosexuals and bisexuals is still a law 
that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation”). 
 342 See Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on Review, supra note 308, at 2. 
 343 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 28 (Kan. 2005) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
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children’s homosexual conduct, it targets more than just conduct; it 
shames lesbian and gay children as a class. 
But in Limon’s briefs, conduct and status were not just conflated; 
the former was wholly subsumed by the latter.344 Even after the Supreme 
Court remanded his appeal “for further consideration in light of 
Lawrence,”345 Limon’s lawyers made only a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause, without adding a parallel claim under the Due 
Process Clause.346 That would have been bad enough, but they made 
matters worse: By going so far as to say that the Romeo and Juliet law 
had “nothing to do with punishing specific conduct,” they gratuitously 
discredited the liberty interest that they had declined to assert.347 
Suppose, for example, that Limon had not considered himself to be 
a “gay teenager.” Should he be required to identify himself in these 
terms in order to challenge the constitutionality of his punishment?348 
Do all teenagers have the liberty to choose homosexual conduct, or is 
this right only reserved for “gay teenagers”? Whatever one thinks about 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, it is worth remembering 
what the Lawrence Court actually held.349 By striking down the Texas 
law under the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection 
Clause, Lawrence established “the liberty of persons to choose” 
homosexual relations and relationships.350 As the Court observed, this is 
“the liberty of all,” not just a freedom for lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people.351 
Without casting aspersions on Limon’s equal protection claim, this 
Article develops the alternative claim that Lawrence protects every 
child’s equal liberty352 to choose between homosexual and heterosexual 
conduct. Even though Lawrence did not “involve minors,” and even 
though children may not have the liberty to engage in any kind of sexual 
 
 344 Cf. Boucai, supra note 316, at 423 (“Lawrence’s recognition that liberty and equality are 
often related . . . . is not . . . an invitation to collapse one value into the other . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 345 Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 346 See Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Brief on Review, supra note 308. 
 347 See id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 348 See Janet Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, 
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 118 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 349 See Boucai, supra note 316, at 417–18, 429 (observing that in same-sex marriage 
litigation, the holding of Lawrence is often neglected in favor of the conduct/status conflation 
presented in O’Connor’s concurrence). 
 350 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 351 Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, (1992)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). For a brilliant exposition of this reading of Lawrence, see 
Boucai, supra note 316, at 421–26. 
 352 I borrow the phrase “equal liberty” from Professor Tribe’s eloquent essay on Lawrence. 
See Tribe, supra note 190, at 1897–98 (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far from having 
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double 
helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.”). 
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conduct, the Due Process Clause still protects children’s liberty to decide 
whether they will engage in homosexual or heterosexual conduct—to 
the extent that they engage in, or are permitted to engage in, sexual 
conduct at all. To parse the same principle in more libertarian terms, the 
state may not specifically discourage children from engaging in 
homosexual conduct, even though it may broadly discourage them from 
engaging in sexual conduct of any kind. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “the power of the 
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its 
authority over adults.”353 When the state acts parens patriae, it “may 
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating 
or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways.”354 Yet there is 
no question that children have the right to “liberty” under the Due 
Process Clause. As the Court has explained, “[c]onstitutional rights do 
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by 
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”355 In the late 1970s, 
the Court was twice asked to consider the extent of children’s liberty 
under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Both cases 
are relevant here, insofar as they touch upon the state’s authority to 
discourage children from engaging in sexual conduct. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court 
invalidated a Missouri law that prohibited an unmarried female under 
eighteen years old from obtaining an abortion without a parent’s written 
consent.356 Although the Court recognized that “the State has somewhat 
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults,” it 
insisted that “[m]inors, as well as adults . . . possess constitutional 
rights.”357 To justify the law’s infringement upon these rights, the Court 
held that the state must show that there is a “significant state interest in 
conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent . . . that is not 
present in the case of an adult.”358 The Court was careful to emphasize 
that “our holding . . . does not suggest that every minor, regardless of 
age or maturity, may give effective consent.”359 But by imposing a 
 
 353 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); see also Carey v. Population Servs., 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (plurality opinion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 
(1968). 
 354 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (footnotes omitted).  
 355 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 435 (1981) (“It is . . . settled that the right to privacy, like many 
constitutional rights, extends to minors.” (footnote omitted)); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 
633–34 (1979). 
 356 Danforth, 428 U.S. 52. 
 357 Id. at 74. 
 358 Id. at 75. 
 359 Id. 
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“blanket”360 consent requirement upon all minors, the Missouri law 
violated “the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to 
have become pregnant.”361 
The following year, in Carey v. Population Services International, 
the Court invalidated a New York law that prohibited the distribution of 
contraceptives to anyone under sixteen years old.362 Seven Justices voted 
to strike down the law, but they did not agree which standard of review 
should be applied. Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice 
Brennan claimed that the law “burdens the exercise of a fundamental 
right,”363 but applied a standard that was “less rigorous than the 
‘compelling state interest’ test applied to restrictions on the privacy 
rights of adults.”364 Borrowing from the standard set forth in Danforth, 
he wrote, “[s]tate restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are 
valid only if they serve ‘any significant state interest . . . that is not 
present in the case of an adult.’”365 
In support of the law, the State argued that it had a significant 
interest in discouraging minors from engaging in sexual conduct; it 
claimed that banning access to contraceptives was a rational means of 
pursuing this goal.366 Yet for a number of reasons, the plurality was not 
convinced that banning access to contraceptives was a rational way of 
discouraging minors from engaging in sexual conduct. First, the 
plurality was troubled by “[t]he argument . . . that minors’ sexual 
activity may be deterred by increasing the hazards attendant on it,” 
because this principle “would support a ban on abortions for minors,”367 
which Danforth had already prohibited. Second, they doubted whether 
“limiting access to contraceptives will in fact substantially discourage 
early sexual behavior.”368 Emphasizing that the State had “no evidence” 
of this “deterrent effect,” the plurality concluded that the law was not “a 
rational means” of achieving the State’s interest, so it could not be 
sustained.369 
Writing separately, Justices Powell, Stevens, and White agreed that 
the law was unconstitutional, but they were sharply critical of the 
plurality’s analysis.370 Rather than applying a new form of heightened 
 
 360 Id. at 74. 
 361 Id. at 75. 
 362 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 363 Id. at 696. 
 364 Id. at 693 n.15. 
 365 Id. at 693 (omission in original) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79).  
 366 Id. at 694. 
 367 Id. 
 368 Id. at 695. 
 369 Id. at 695–96. 
 370 Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part); id. at 707 
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 712 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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scrutiny, they would have invalidated the law under rational basis 
review. Invoking “[c]ommon sense,” Justice Stevens reasoned that 
“many young people will engage in sexual activity regardless of what the 
New York Legislature does,”371 and Justice White found no evidence 
that the law “measurably contributes to the deterrent purposes which 
the State advances.”372 Justice Powell found that the law unjustifiably 
infringed upon the a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of his or her 
child by prohibiting parents from distributing contraceptives to their 
children.373 
Taken together, Carey and Lawrence demonstrate that moral 
disapproval of children’s homosexual conduct is not a legitimate state 
interest under the Due Process Clause. In Carey, seven Justices agreed 
that any law that regulates the sexual activity of minors must at least 
satisfy rational basis review, if not a higher standard. In Lawrence, the 
Court held that a law that prohibits homosexual conduct could not be 
 
 371 Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 372 Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). 
 373 Id. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Above all, the 
Justices in Carey sparred sharply over the scope of the state’s authority to discourage sexual 
activity among minors. In a bold move, the plaintiffs had claimed that “the State’s policy to 
discourage sexual activity of minors is itself unconstitutional” because “the right to privacy 
comprehends a right of minors as well as adults to engage in private consensual sexual 
behavior.” Id. at 694 n.17 (plurality opinion). Taken to its logical extreme, this claim would 
have swept aside many laws that the Court had not yet considered—not only adultery and 
sodomy laws, but statutory rape and child sexual abuse laws. See id. (“[T]he Court has not 
definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution 
prohibits state statutes regulating such behavior among adults.”). Without resolving these 
questions, the plurality noted that “in the area of sexual mores, as in other areas, the scope of 
permissible state regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults.” Id. (citing Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). After observing that “[t]he question of the extent of state 
power to regulate conduct of minors . . . is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise 
answer,” id. at 692, the plurality proceeded from “the assumption that the Constitution does 
not bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors,” id. at 694 n.17. 
  The concurring Justices, by contrast, would have emphatically declared that the state has 
a compelling interest in discouraging minors from engaging in sexual behavior. Rather than 
leaving this question unresolved, Justices White and Stevens would have rejected “as ‘frivolous’ 
[the plaintiff’s] argument that a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives to their 
intended use, notwithstanding the combined objection of both parents and the State.” Id. at 
702–03 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Similarly, Justice Powell saw “no justification 
for subjecting restrictions on the sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial review.” Id. 
at 705. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Like Justices White and 
Stevens, he concluded that “the relevant question in any case where state laws impinge on the 
freedom of action of young people in sexual matters is whether the restriction rationally serves 
valid state interests.” Id. at 707. 
  While this debate has important implications for the scope of children’s liberty to engage 
in sexual conduct, it is not relevant to the state’s interest in discouraging children from 
engaging in homosexual conduct. As explained in the text, seven Justices in Carey agreed that 
any law that regulates the sexual activity of minors must at least satisfy rational basis review. 
Because the state has no specific interest in discouraging children from engaging in homosexual 
conduct, it cannot rely upon this interest to satisfy rational basis review. 
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justified by the majority’s belief that homosexual conduct is immoral, 
because such a justification is tautological.374 
In Limon, the modest principles of Carey and Lawrence would have 
been more than sufficient to dispose of the State’s interests in “the 
protection and preservation of the traditional sexual mores of society” 
and the “preservation of the historical notions of appropriate sexual 
development of children.”375 Just as the State’s law could not be justified 
by animus against lesbian and gay teenagers under the Equal Protection 
Clause, it could not be justified by moral disapproval of homosexual 
conduct under the Due Process Clause.376 Even if the state has a broad 
interest in discouraging minors from engaging in sexual conduct, it does 
not have a particular interest in discouraging them from engaging in 
homosexual conduct. Regardless of whether the Due Process Clause 
grants children the liberty to engage in sexual relations, it grants them 
an equal liberty to choose between homosexual and heterosexual 
relations. 
IV.     PROMOTING HETEROSEXUALITY IN CHILDHOOD: A MEANS TO AN 
END? 
Until this point, this Article has focused on attacking the premise 
that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting heterosexuality in 
childhood. It has argued that promoting heterosexuality cannot serve as 
an end in itself, because the state may not rely on self-serving 
 
 374 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
 375 State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 33–34 (Kan. 2005). 
 376 Indeed, even though Limon chose not to challenge his punishment under the Due 
Process Clause, the Kansas Supreme Court implied that Carey undermined the State’s claim 
that the Romeo and Juliet law promoted “the moral and sexual development of children.” Id. at 
35. As the court explained, “the Carey rationale suggests that even when the articulated interest 
is the protection of minors, there still must be a connection between the State’s interest and the 
classification and, if the burden would not be allowed if placed upon an adult, the State’s 
interest must be unique to children.” Id. In light of this requirement, the court reasoned that 
“unless the justifications for criminalizing homosexual activity between teenagers . . . are 
somehow different than the justifications for criminalizing adult homosexual activity, those 
justifications must fail.” Id. In the absence of any showing that “homosexual sexual activity is 
more harmful to minors than adults,” the court found that the disparity in Limon’s punishment 
failed even the minimal requirements of rational basis review. Id. 
  As soon as the court laid out this requirement, however, it slipped back into Limon’s 
equal protection analysis, which was based on Justice O’Connor’s conflation of conduct with 
status. For example, the court referred to “the exclusion of gay teens” from the Romeo and 
Juliet Law and claimed that under Lawrence, “moral disapproval of a group cannot be a 
legitimate governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the court gratuitously held 
that the State’s policy was not rationally related to children’s sexual development, because it 
concluded that a teenager’s sexual orientation is immutable: “[S]exual orientation is already 
settled by the time a child turns 14, . . . sexual orientation is not affected by the sexual 
experiences teenagers have, and . . . efforts to pressure teens into changing their sexual 
orientation are not effective.” Id. 
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justifications for restricting constitutional rights. Regardless of how this 
justification is framed—in terms of status, conduct, or speech—it is an 
empty argument that cannot satisfy any standard of judicial review. 
This Part briefly examines whether the state could justify the 
promotion of heterosexuality in childhood on independent grounds—as 
a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. After briefly surveying 
the justifications that school officials have proffered in First 
Amendment cases, it turns to three independent justifications that 
Kansas offered in defense of the Romeo and Juliet law in State v. 
Limon—the state’s interest in promoting public health, procreation, and 
parenting. 
A.     Back to School: Advocacy of Illegal Conduct, Material and 
Substantial Interference, and the Heckler’s Veto 
In First Amendment cases involving GSAs and gay students, 
schools have been trying to come up with independent justifications for 
discouraging homosexuality for nearly four decades, but they have not 
been successful. In Bonner, the First Circuit held that a school could not 
prevent gay students from hosting social functions simply because the 
school and the community viewed homosexuality as “abhorrent or 
offensive.”377 In subsequent cases, schools responded by attempting to 
offer alternative, independent justifications for such policies. In cases 
like Gay Lib and Pryor, for example, schools claimed that recognizing 
gay student organizations would lead more students to engage in 
sodomy,378 which was still criminalized in some jurisdictions as recently 
as ten years ago.379 When courts rejected these claims, schools then 
argued that allowing pro-gay expression would trigger bullying and 
harassment from other students, which would “materially and 
substantially interfere” with school discipline.380 When courts rejected 
these claims as a variation on the “heckler’s veto,”381 schools were left 
 
 377 Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974). For a 
discussion of Bonner see supra Part I.B. 
 378 Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1545, 1547–49 (11th Cir. 1997); Gay Lib 
v. Univ. of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1370 (W.D. Mo. 1976), overruled by 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 
1977). For discussions of Gay Lib and Pryor see supra Part I.B. 
 379 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (observing that thirteen states had sodomy 
laws in 2003). 
 380 Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 691 
(E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1146 
(C.D. Cal. 2000); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. 
Supp. 2d 1166, 1191–93 (D. Utah 1999). For a discussion of Boyd and related cases see supra 
Part I.B. 
 381 Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
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without any independent justifications for specifically targeting the 
expression of gay students and pro-gay views.382 
B.     Back to Kansas: Public Health, Procreation, and Parenting 
To the best of my knowledge, Limon is the only case in which a 
state has presented any genuinely independent justifications for 
promoting heterosexuality in children. This is hardly surprising, given 
that the Romeo and Juliet law was so clearly and precisely directed at 
pursuing this goal. By lowering the penalties for teenagers who engaged 
in heterosexual conduct, while maintaining higher penalties for 
teenagers who engaged in homosexual conduct, the Kansas State 
Legislature squarely posed the question of whether the State could offer 
any independent reason for promoting heterosexuality in children. 
As the Kansas Supreme Court explained, the State offered six 
justifications for specifically targeting homosexual conduct among 
minors: 
(1) the protection and preservation of the traditional sexual mores of 
society; (2) preservation of the historical notions of appropriate 
sexual development of children; (3) protection of teenagers against 
coercive relationships; (4) protection of teenagers from the increased 
health risks that accompany sexual activity; (5) promotion of 
parental responsibility and procreation; and (6) protection of those 
in group homes.383 
As explained in Parts I through III, the first and second interests 
are not even legitimate because they are circular: The first is based on 
society’s moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, which Lawrence 
rejects;384 the second is based on the desire to minimize the number of 
lesbian and gay people, which Romer rejects.385 The remaining interests 
are both legitimate and independent, but the question remains whether 
any of them is rationally related to the State’s policy of targeting 
homosexual conduct among minors. 
The third and sixth justifications barely merit analysis, because 
they are plainly irrelevant to this objective. To be sure, the state has a 
strong interest in protecting minors from rape, sexual assault, and other 
forms of sexual abuse, and it has an interest in protecting people who 
 
 382 In an echo of the public pool closings from the civil rights era, some schools have taken 
the remarkable step of banning all extra-curricular activities from campus. This has led to 
protracted litigation over which clubs qualify as “curricular” and “non-curricular.” See, e.g., E. 
High, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–85. 
 383 Limon v. State, 122 P.3d 22, 33–34 (Kan. 2005). 
 384 See supra Parts I.D, III.C. 
 385 See supra Parts I.C, III.B. 
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live in group homes.386 (At the time of Limon’s offense, he and M.A.R. 
were living in a home for minors with developmental disabilities.) But 
as the Kansas Supreme Court explained, neither of these interests had 
anything to do with the disparity in Limon’s punishment.387 Limon was 
convicted under the State’s sodomy law rather than the voluntary sexual 
relations laws for only one reason: He had engaged in sexual activity 
with another male. The homosexual nature of his conduct did not 
render his conduct “coercive,”388 and his conviction was not based on 
the fact that the conduct occurred in a group home.389 
1.     Public Health 
This leaves only the fourth and fifth justifications—public health, 
procreation, and parenting. The first thing to note about these 
justifications is that they are familiar: They closely track the 
justifications offered for discouraging homosexual conduct among 
consenting adults. In Bowers and Lawrence, sodomy laws were defended 
as measures designed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases.390 In same-sex marriage cases, laws that prohibit same-sex 
couples from marrying are routinely defended as efforts to promote 
“responsible procreation,”391 “optimal” parenting,392 and “biological 
parent[ing].”393 
With respect to public health, the State claimed that homosexual 
conduct posed a higher risk of HIV infection than heterosexual 
 
 386 Limon, 122 P.3d at 35, 38. 
 387 Id. 
 388 Id. at 36. 
 389 Id. at 38. 
 390 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et al., 
in Support of Respondent at 15–16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) 
(arguing that Texas sodomy law was “rationally related to protecting the public health” because 
“men who have sex with men, perhaps 2 percent of the U.S. population, account for 60 percent 
of Texas men with HIV/AIDS, 63 percent of the cumulative number of AIDS cases in U.S. men, 
and over 51 percent of all U.S. AIDS cases” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers Attorney General of Georgia at 37, Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (arguing that Georgia sodomy law was justified by 
“the relationship of homosexual sodomy in the transmission of [AIDS] and other diseases such 
as anorectal gonorrhea, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, enteric protozoal diseases, and 
Cytomegalovirus”). 
 391 See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 392 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
 393 See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the 
U.S. House of Representatives at 47–48, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 
12-307) [hereinafter BLAG Brief]; Defendant-Intervenors’ Trial Memorandum at 8–9, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW). 
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conduct.394 By discouraging minors from engaging in homosexual 
conduct, the State claimed, the law was protecting minors from HIV 
risk.395 But as the court explained, the connection between homosexual 
conduct and HIV risk was weak, so the State’s policy was both over- and 
under-inclusive.396 First, “the risk of transmission of the HIV infection 
through female to female contact is negligible.”397 Second, “[t]here is a 
near-zero chance of acquiring the HIV infection through the conduct 
which gave rise to this case, oral sex between males, or through 
cunnilingus.”398 Finally, even “the risk of HIV transmission during anal 
sex with an infected partner is the same,” regardless of whether the 
conduct is heterosexual or homosexual.399 
Even if the State’s policy is viewed in more positive terms—as a 
form of leniency for heterosexual conduct, rather than a heightened 
punishment for homosexual conduct—the public health argument does 
not fare any better. In a glib moment, the Limon court observed that the 
state’s Romeo and Juliet law was “[o]bviously” not designed to prevent 
teenage pregnancies, given that it lowered the penalties for heterosexual 
intercourse among teenagers.400 Emphasizing that pregnancy was a far 
more prevalent phenomenon than HIV infection among teenagers in 
Kansas—and referring to teenage pregnancy as a “public health 
risk”401—the court implied that there was little logic in the legislature’s 
decision to address one problem while ignoring the other.402 
The court’s aside about teenage pregnancy reveals that the state’s 
conception of “public health” is profoundly sexist, in addition to being 
heterosexist. For girls, the “homosexual lifestyle” is significantly (indeed, 
vastly) more healthy than its heterosexual counterpart. To the extent 
that girls engage exclusively in homosexual conduct, they face 
dramatically lower risks of HIV infection and pregnancy,403 as well as 
 
 394 Limon, 122 P.3d at 36. While the State’s argument could have been framed in terms of 
other sexually transmitted diseases, the argument’s weaknesses are aptly illustrated by the 
example of HIV. 
 395 See id. 
 396 Id. 
 397 Id.  
 398 Id. at 37. 
 399 Id. 
 400 Id. 
 401 Id. Studies have shown that teenage pregnancy exposes girls to significantly higher risks 
of high blood pressure, preeclampsia, and postpartum depression. See Aubrey J. Cunnington, 
What’s So Bad About Teenage Pregnancy?, 27 J. FAM. PLAN. & REPROD. HEALTH CARE 36 
(2001); William M. Gilbert et al., Birth Outcomes in Teenage Pregnancies, 16 J. MATERNAL-
FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 265 (2004). 
 402 Limon, 122 P.3d at 37. 
 403 See, e.g., George F. Lemp et al., HIV Seroprevalence and Risk Behaviors Among Lesbians 
and Bisexual Women in San Francisco and Berkeley, California, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1549, 
1549 (1995). 
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rape, sexual assault, and domestic or intimate partner violence.404 By any 
measure, these are significant health benefits that have the potential to 
transform women’s lives. If anything, the state has a legitimate interest 
in discouraging girls from engaging in heterosexual conduct. 
It is only by focusing exclusively on male homosexual conduct—
and specifically on the receptive role in anal sex—that the State’s public 
health argument can find even a conceivable footing in the realities of 
HIV risk.405 Even then, the argument still ignores the fact that unlike 
heterosexual sex, homosexual sex presents no risk of teenage 
pregnancies. 
The irony is evident: Opponents of LGBT rights have often argued 
that “homosexuals cannot reproduce, so they must recruit,” to justify a 
broad range of policies that discriminate against LGBT adults.406 In the 
context of childhood, however, heterosexuality’s procreative power 
seems misplaced—or at least, it is not obviously advantageous, as 
commonly presumed. 
2.     Procreation and Parenting 
This brings us to the State’s last justification for discouraging 
minors from engaging in homosexual conduct—the “promotion of 
parental responsibility and procreation.”407 Although these are common 
justification for laws against same-sex marriage,408 they are bizarre ways 
 
 404 See, e.g., Patricia Tjaden et al., Comparing Violence Over the Life Span in Samples of 
Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Cohabitants, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 413 (1999) (finding that 
intimate partner violence is less-likely among lesbian couples and intimate partner violence is 
primarily perpetuated by men). 
 405 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (holding that even under rational basis 
review, the state’s justification “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed 
by the legislation”). By noting these disconnects in the State’s public health argument, I do not 
mean to suggest that there are no correlations between homosexual acts and HIV risks or other 
STD risks. In one recent study of twenty-one cities, 19% of men who have sex with men were 
infected with HIV, and nearly half of them were unaware that they were infected. Teresa J. 
Finlayson et al., HIV Risk, Prevention, and Testing Behaviors Among Men Who Have Sex with 
Men—National HIV Behavioral Surveillance System, 21 U.S. Cities, United States, 2008, 60 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.: SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 1 (2011). My broader 
contention is that even if such correlations exist, they have very little to do with the fear of the 
queer child, so they cannot justify the state’s policy of promoting heterosexuality and gender 
conformity in childhood. The fear of the queer child is too old and broad to be justified as a 
response to anything so new and specific as the HIV epidemic. See David Halperin, Deviant 
Teaching, in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 
146 (George E. Haggerty & Molly McGarry eds., 2007); Rosky, supra note 3, at 618–20.  
 406 See, e.g., DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO 
BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 303 (1999) (quoting Anita Bryant’s claim that 
“since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit”). 
 407 Limon, 122 P.3d at 34. 
 408 Opponents of same-sex marriage often describe this justification as the state’s interest in 
promoting “responsible procreation.” See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Notice of Motion and 
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to justify policies directed at the sexual activity of minors. As Limon 
argued, “this justification . . . make[s] no sense since the State’s interest 
is to discourage teen pregnancies, not encourage them.”409 In this 
context, the state’s interest in promoting “responsible” procreation and 
parenting seems oxymoronic.410 How can the state promote 
“responsible” procreation and parenting by steering minors toward 
heterosexual sex? 
In theory, the State could have tried to resolve this paradox by 
broadening the timeframe of the policy’s objectives. In Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, for example, the sponsors of Proposition 8 claimed that 
“[f]ostering relationships that are capable of producing offspring is a 
vital social and governmental interest . . . [because] procreation is 
essential to our survival.”411 In this stripped down version of the 
procreation argument, Kansas might have claimed that the Romeo and 
Juliet law would encourage teenagers to develop heterosexual desires, 
form heterosexual relationships, and engage in heterosexual conduct—
but only later in life, once they were adults. By encouraging boys to date 
girls and vice-versa, the state might marginally increase the likelihood 
that children will grow up to be parents. 
The standard objections to this kind of argument are familiar, and 
they need not be belabored: As many courts have observed, 
 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 123, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 92330 [hereinafter Defendant-
Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
 409 Id. at 37. 
 410 When Limon initially appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, one judge tried to 
sidestep this paradox by observing that “sexual contact between minors and young adults can 
lead to unwanted pregnancies.” State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 237 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). “When a 
child is born,” he explained, “the minor is often unable to financially support the newborn 
child.” Id. Under such circumstances, he reasoned, “incarcerating the young adult parent for a 
long period would be counterproductive to the requirement that a parent has a duty to provide 
support to his or her minor child.” Id. Because “same-sex relationships do not generally lead to 
unwanted pregnancies,” he concluded, “the need to release the same-sex offender from 
incarceration is absent.” Id. 
  This argument nicely dramatizes the absurdity of the “responsible procreation” 
justification for laws against same-sex marriage. In Hernandez v. Robles, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that because “[h]eterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the 
birth of children” and “such relationships are all too often casual or temporary,” the State 
“could choose to offer an inducement—in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits—to 
opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.” 855 N.E.2d 1, 
7 (N.Y. 2006). “[T]his rationale for marriage does not apply with comparable force to same-sex 
couples,” the court explained, because “they do not become parents as a result of accident or 
impulse.” Id. In Limon, the judge invoked this perverse logic not as a justification for 
withholding marriage, but as the basis for imprisoning an eighteen year-old male for seventeen 
years. For a thorough analysis of this argument’s flaws, see Edward Stein, The Accident 
Procreation Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403 (2009). 
 411 Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 408, at 115. 
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heterosexuality does not guarantee procreation and homosexuality does 
not preclude it.412 The Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether 
these objections are fatal to all policies that discriminate against lesbian 
and gay people under rational basis review or whether such policies 
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under one theory or another. 
This Article does not aim to resolve these weighty questions, but 
rather to show that they are no less relevant to children than they are to 
adults. For many years, our legal system has presumed that the state has 
a legitimate interest in promoting heterosexuality in children, without 
bothering to justify this preference on other grounds. Discrimination 
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual people should stand or fall upon 
independent justifications, rather than resting on the unchallenged 
premise that the state may encourage children to be straight and 
discourage them from being queer. 
V.     PROMOTING GENDER CONFORMITY IN CHILDHOOD 
If the state may not promote heterosexuality in childhood, then 
what about gender conformity? Although the issue of gender 
conformity appears late in this Article, it is not an afterthought. Because 
the concepts of sexuality and gender are so intertwined—especially 
during childhood—an analysis of one would not be complete without a 
corresponding analysis of the other. By definition, the concept of sexual 
orientation depends on an underlying concept of gender or sex.413 To 
determine a person’s sexual orientation, one must determine the 
person’s sex and the sex of the people to whom he or she is attracted. As 
a result, it is impossible to make distinctions based on sexual orientation 
without making distinctions based on sex. In this sense, the state’s 
interest in promoting heterosexuality in children is itself a form of 
discrimination based on sex: By promoting heterosexuality in children, 
the state is encouraging children to identify with one particular sex—
male or female—and pursue relations and relationships with the other 
sex. 
Yet the links between sexuality and gender are grounded in history, 
as well as logic. As many historians have observed, the conflation of sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation is a long-standing tradition in Western 
cultures.414 In the late nineteenth-century, as sexologists developed the 
 
 412 See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (“Same-sex couples can have (or adopt) and raise 
children.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“Our laws of 
civil marriage . . . . contain[] no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to 
their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus.”). 
 413 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 485–87 (2001). 
 414 See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Dykes, Sissies, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation 
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modern concept of “homosexuality,” they originally posited that same-
sex desire was but one symptom of “sexual inversion”—a disorder in 
which a woman’s brain was trapped in a man’s body, or vice-versa.415 It 
was only in the early twentieth century that the concept of “the 
homosexual” was popularized,416 and even today, the legal and social 
boundaries between sexuality and gender remain incomplete, unstable, 
and impermanent.417 
This dynamic is rarely more apparent than in discussions of 
childhood, where the concepts of sexuality and gender are so “intimately 
entangled” that they can barely be distinguished.418 Examples abound: 
The playground practice of boys branding each other as “sissies” and 
“fags”; the widespread practice of inferring a person’s homosexuality 
from his or her failure to conform to traditional gender norms; or the 
justification of anti-gay marriage laws by reference to the state’s interest 
in providing children with “a parental authority figure of each 
gender.”419 
In recent years, the state’s interest in promoting children’s gender 
conformity has become increasingly salient in debates over LGBT rights. 
In response to the rising social acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people, opponents of gay parenting have lately begun to back away from 
explicit claims about providing children with “heterosexual role 
modeling,”420 in favor of vague claims about providing children with 
“parental role models of both sexes.”421 During this same period, 
opponents of antidiscrimination laws have shifted from Anita Bryant’s 
claim that children would be “recruited” by homosexual teachers,422 in 
favor of strikingly similar claims about children being indoctrinated by 
“men dressed as women,” “drag queens,” and “cross-dressing 
teachers.”423 In light of this now-common dynamic in anti-LGBT 
rhetoric, it would be both a legal and moral failing to mount a 
constitutional defense of children’s homosexuality without offering a 
parallel defense of children’s gender variance. 
 
of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
 415 George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the 
Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance, 58–59 SALMAGUNDI 114 (1982–83). 
 416 DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15–18 (1990). 
 417 Valdes, supra note 414. 
 418 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 SOC. TEXT 18, 20 (1991). 
 419 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1000 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting). 
 420 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d. 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 421 BLAG Brief, supra note 393, at 48; see also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 
2006) (“Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her 
eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a woman are like.”). 
 422 CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 406, at 299.  
 423 The Issues, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, supra note 9.  
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A.     The Constitution of Gender Variance 
The threshold question is how to conceptualize children’s gender 
variance in constitutional terms—i.e., terms that are cognizable within 
the Supreme Court’s free speech, equal protection, and due process 
jurisprudence. In this context, the concept of “gender identity” seems to 
correspond well enough to the concept of “homosexual status”: It refers 
to a person’s internal sense of being male, female, or something else—
roughly as “sexual orientation” refers to a person’s internal sense of 
being lesbian, gay, or bisexual.424 But the distinction between “speech” 
and “conduct” seems less helpful here. While scholars across many 
disciplines have distinguished “gender identity” from the more external, 
social aspect of gender—which is variously referred to as “gender 
role,”425 “gender expression,”426 or “gender behavior”427—the latter is 
widely understood to encompass both an individual’s speech and 
conduct. In the context of gender, it seems clear that our actions are 
inherently expressive—in Judith Butler’s famous words, they are the 
“performance” of gender428—which renders any distinction between 
speech and conduct likely to be legally trivial, if not meaningless. To 
reflect this double entendre, this Article uses the term “gender role” to 
refer to the external, social aspect of gender that a person manifests in 
both speech and conduct—in word and in deed. 
In constitutional terms, the question is whether the state has any 
legitimate interest in encouraging every child to identify as male and 
adopt a masculine role, or identify as female and adopt a feminine role, 
in conformity with the child’s designated birth sex. When this issue is 
viewed purely as a matter of law and logic, it seems fairly 
straightforward. Reading Supreme Court opinions, it is abundantly clear 
that the state may not invoke concerns about children’s gender 
conformity as a legitimate state interest. In a long line of cases, the 
Court has held that state action may not be justified by “overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of 
 
 424 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, GENDER IDENTITY, AND GENDER EXPRESSION 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.pdf. 
 425 See, e.g., LINDA L. LINDSEY, GENDER ROLES: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (5th ed. 
2010). 
 426 See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 424, at 1. 
 427 See, e.g., Nicole Crawford, Understanding Children’s Atypical Gender Behavior, 34 
MONITOR 40 (2003), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/sep03/children.aspx. 
 428 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 178–79 
(1999) (arguing that “the action of gender requires a performance that is repeated” and that 
“[g]ender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various 
acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior 
space through a stylized repetition of acts”). 
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males and females”429 or “fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.”430 Nearly forty years ago, the Court 
expressly recognized that this principle applies to children as well as 
adults: “A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female 
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the 
male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”431 Whatever 
exceptions the Court may allow for policies based on “[p]hysical 
differences between men and women,”432 the state’s interest in teaching 
boys to be masculine and girls to be feminine is not among them.433 
The more challenging question is whether courts have the courage 
to act upon this conviction by upholding children’s right to deviate from 
traditional gender identities and roles. It would be an understatement to 
say that cases specifically addressing this question are rare. Although 
studies indicate that discrimination against transgender students 
remains prevalent in public schools, there has not yet been a single 
reported case involving a constitutional dispute between a school and a 
student who identifies as “transgender,” “transsexual,” or as an 
individual with “gender identity disorder” or “gender dysphoria.”434 
To date, the leading case on this subject remains Doe v. Yunits, an 
unpublished ruling from thirteen years ago.435 In Doe, a Massachusetts 
state court held that the State Constitution’s guarantees of free 
expression and liberty protected a transgender student’s right to attend 
 
 429 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 430 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 283 (1979) (rejecting stereotypes about the “proper place” of women (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (rejecting “archaic and 
overbroad generalizations” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (same); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (same); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion) (rejecting “gross, stereotyped 
distinctions between the sexes”). 
 431 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975). 
 432 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (“Physical differences between men and women . . . are 
enduring . . . . Sex classifications may be used to compensate women for particular economic 
disabilities [they have] suffered, to promot[e] equal employment opportunity, [or] to advance 
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.” (third and fourth 
alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 433 See Susan Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 131–32 (2005); Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay 
Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691 
(2003).  
 434 See, e.g., GAY, LESBIAN, & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, 2011 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE 
SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR 
NATION’S SCHOOLS 16 (2011), available at http://glsen.org/sites/default/files/2011%20National
%20School%20Climate%20Survey%20Full%20Report.pdf (reporting that “[o]ver half (56.9%) 
of students [in a national survey] heard teachers or other staff make negative comments about a 
student’s gender expression at school”). 
 435 No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff'd sub nom., Doe v. 
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). 
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school in girls’ clothing, in spite of the principal’s strident and persistent 
objections.436 
By juxtaposing Doe with a less successful case involving a high 
school student’s right to challenge traditional gender roles, Section B of 
this Part examines the extent to which the First Amendment protects a 
child’s right to deviate from traditional gender identities and roles. 
Drawing on the work of Professor Paisley Currah, this Section argues 
that courts have often privileged First Amendment claims based on 
children’s gender identity, rather than claims based on children’s gender 
roles. On a more expansive and hopeful note, Section C turns to 
McMillien v. Itawamba County School District, a recent case in which a 
court upheld a lesbian student’s right to attend her prom while wearing 
a tuxedo, as an expression of her viewpoint that “students should not be 
forced to wear clothes that conform to traditional gender norms.”437 
Finally, Sections D and E briefly consider the prospects of defending 
children’s gender variance as a form of status or conduct under the 
Constitution’s equal protection and due process guarantees. 
B.     Gender Identity and the First Amendment: Gender as Status 
In 1998, Pat Doe began attending the seventh grade at public 
school in Brockton, Massachusetts.438 Although Pat was biologically 
male, she “began to express her female gender identity by wearing girls’ 
make up, shirts, and fashion accessories to school.”439 The school had a 
dress code that prohibited “clothing which could be disruptive or 
distractive to the educational process or which could affect the safety of 
students.”440 When the principal noticed Pat wearing girls’ clothing, he 
would often send her home to change. On some days she changed and 
came back to school; on other days, she stayed home, “too upset to 
return.”441 
After seeing a therapist, Pat was diagnosed with gender identity 
disorder. Her therapist determined that it was medically necessary for 
Pat to wear clothing consistent with her female gender identity and that 
failing to do so could be psychologically harmful. When Pat returned to 
eighth grade in the fall, the principal instructed her to come to his office 
every day so that he could approve her appearance.442 After awhile, Pat 
stopped attending school altogether, citing the “hostile environment” 
 
 436 Id. 
 437 702 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (N.D. Miss. 2010). 
 438 Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1. 
 439 Id. 
 440 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 441 Id. 
 442 Id. 
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created by the principal.443 Because of her many absences, she was 
required to repeat the eighth grade the following year. 
Throughout this period, Pat experienced trouble with her 
classmates. In one instance, a boy claimed that Pat had been “spreading 
rumors that the two had engaged in oral sex,” and the boy had to be 
restrained from punching her.444 In another incident, Pat “persistently 
blew kisses” to another boy, and officials had to break up a fight between 
them.445 In yet another case, Pat “grabbed the buttock” of a boy in the 
cafeteria.446 More generally, Pat had “been known to primp, pose, apply 
make up, and flirt with other students in class” and call attention to 
herself “by yelling and dancing in the halls.”447 Finally, she had “been 
suspended at least three times for using the ladies’ restroom after being 
warned not to.”448 
When Pat return to school in 2000, the principal informed her that 
“she would not be allowed to attend South Junior High if she were to 
wear any outfits disruptive to the educational process, specifically 
padded bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs.”449 Pat sought a preliminary 
injunction in state court, alleging that the principal’s actions violated the 
free expression, liberty, and sex discrimination clauses of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.450 
The court began by observing that the analysis of the free 
expression guarantee under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is 
“guided by federal free speech analysis.”451 First, the court held that Pat 
was likely to establish that wearing clothing and accessories 
“traditionally associated with the female gender” was a form of 
“expressive” conduct, because she was “expressing her identification 
with that gender.”452 Next, the court found that the school’s policy was 
neither viewpoint-neutral nor content-neutral “because biological 
females who wear items such as tight skirts to school are unlikely to be 
disciplined by school officials.”453 Similarly, in response to the school’s 
claim that Pat’s clothing would “materially and substantially interfere[] 
with the work of the school,”454 the court reasoned that “if a female 
student came to school in a frilly dress or blouse, make-up, or padded 
 
 443 Id. 
 444 Id. 
 445 Id. 
 446 Id. 
 447 Id. 
 448 Id. 
 449 Id. at *2. 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. at *3. 
 452 Id. 
 453 Id. at *4. 
 454 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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bra, she would go . . . unnoticed by school officials.”455 The court 
acknowledged that Pat had engaged in “detrimental” behavior at times, 
but insisted that she could be punished only for her “misconduct” rather 
than her expression of “gender identity through dress.”456 Finally, in 
response to the school’s claim that other students had threatened to beat 
up the “boy who dressed like a girl,” the court ruled that the school was 
obligated to protect Pat from other students, rather than granting her 
classmates a “heckler’s veto.”457 
After holding that Pat was likely to prevail on her free expression 
claim, the court reached the same conclusion about her liberty and 
equality claims. Analyzing her liberty claim, the court observed that “[a] 
liberty interest . . . has been recognized to protect a male student’s right 
to wear his hair as he wishes.”458 Because Pat was likely to show that her 
attire was not distracting, the court held that the school’s interests in 
maintaining discipline were not strong enough to overcome her 
“recognized liberty interest in appearance.”459 Considering her equality 
claim, the court found that she was “being discriminated against on the 
basis of her sex, which is biologically male.”460 Rejecting the school’s 
claim that dress codes fostered “conformity with community 
standards,”461 the court refused to “allow the stifling of plaintiff’s 
selfhood merely because it causes some members of the community 
discomfort.”462 In the court’s view, the school was enforcing the dress 
code “in a gender discriminatory manner” by refusing to recognize the 
plaintiff’s identity as female.463 
By highlighting the court’s ruling in Doe v. Yunits, I do not mean to 
imply that it is the tip of an iceberg, or that the First Amendment offers 
a clear avenue through which litigators can vindicate the free expression 
of transgender and gender-variant students. In Tinker itself, the 
Supreme Court contrasted a student’s political expression with clothing, 
grooming, and deportment: “The problem posed by the present case 
does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of 
clothing, to hair style, or deportment.”464 In subsequent rulings, lower 
courts have often cited this language from Tinker to dismiss student 
 
 455 Id. 
 456 Id. at *5. 
 457 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 458 Id. at *6 (citing Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
 459 Id. 
 460 Id. 
 461 Id. at *7. 
 462 Id. 
 463 Id. 
 464 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1969). 
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challenges to a school’s clothing, hair style, and deportment 
regulations.465 
In a recent essay, Paisley Currah reports that only four years after 
Doe was decided, a student named Nikki Youngblood lost a case in 
Hillsborough County, Florida.466 As Currah explains, the contrast 
between Doe and Youngblood is instructive.467 When Nikki showed up 
for her senior yearbook photo wearing a shirt and a tie, she was told that 
“she could not have her picture taken unless she complied with the 
school’s yearbook dress-code policy, which required all girls to wear a 
revealing, velvetlike, scoop-neck drape for their portraits.”468 Faced with 
these options, Nikki chose to forego the photo. Neither her name nor 
her photo appeared in the yearbook. “It’s like I never went to 
Robinson,” she later explained.469 
Like Doe, Youngblood brought free expression and equal 
protection claims against her school.470 Youngblood’s lawyers did not 
claim that she was diagnosed with gender identity disorder, but they 
emphasized that her gender variance had been present from a “very 
young age.”471 They argued that her desire to wear a shirt and tie was 
intended to send a “message” that “women do not have to conform to 
gender stereotypes.”472 The judge not only rejected her claims but 
belittled them, finding that there was “no constitutionally protected 
right for a female to wear a shirt and tie for senior portraits.”473 Citing a 
case decided thirty years earlier, the judge compared the school’s 
yearbook policy to a hair length requirement for boys, finding that the 
former required “even less justification” than the latter.474 In the judge’s 
view, a hair length policy “affects students 24-hours a day, seven days a 
week, nine months a year,” but a yearbook policy was no more than a 
fleeting infringement on a student’s interests.475 
By contrasting Youngblood with Doe, Currah reveals how our legal 
system’s investment in identity politics—specifically, in the protection 
of groups that exhibit “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics”476—can influence both the shape and the fate of First 
 
 465 Currah, supra note 25, at 19. 
 466 Youngblood v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., No. 8:02-CV-1089 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 
24, 2002); Currah, supra note 25, at 7.  
 467 Currah, supra note 25, at 7. 
 468 Id. 
 469 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 470 Youngblood, No. 8:02-CV-1089, slip op. at 2.  
 471 Currah, supra note 25, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 472 Id. at 10–11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 473 Youngblood, No. 8:02-CV-1089, slip op. at 7; Currah, supra note 25 at 11. 
 474 Youngblood, No. 8:02-CV-1089, slip op. at 5–7 (citing Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th 
Cir. 1972)); Currah, supra note 25 at 11. 
 475 Youngblood, No. 8:02-CV-1089, slip op. at 6; Currah, supra note 25 at 11. 
 476 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987). 
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Amendment claims brought by transgender students.477 In Doe, the 
plaintiff won because she was diagnosed with gender identity disorder; 
expressing her “identity” became a medical need. In Youngblood, the 
plaintiff lost because she had no diagnosis—she was expressing nothing 
more than a “message,” which the court casually trivialized. Illustrating 
this contrast, the Doe court observed that the plaintiff was expressing 
something that was “not merely personal preference,” but “her very 
identity,” “her quintessence,” and her “selfhood.”478 This is not just 
essentialism; it is quintessentialism: The court upholds Doe’s right to 
express her gender, but only because it is a pure expression of her self.479 
Even as the court vindicated the plaintiff’s right to “freely” express her 
gender identity, it grounded her freedom on the claim that her gender 
identity was fixed early in life and could not be changed.480 In effect, 
courts have been more willing to protect gender as an identity or 
status—as an unchosen or immutable trait—rather than as the 
expression of a particular viewpoint. 
As Professor Currah observes, this dynamic is not likely to please 
queer theorists, many of whom are critical of the law’s investment in 
identity politics, and have urged LGBT advocates to exploit “the 
liberatory potential of the free speech clause of the First Amendment.”481 
Because a transgender student’s “identity-based claims remain more 
juridically intelligible in the way they link identities to bodies,” he 
explains, such status-based claims “often produce better results.”482 
While Currah is careful not to suggest that “arguments based on free 
expression should not be made by transgender rights advocates,” he 
warns that it may be a long time before such claims are recognized.483 
 
 477 Currah, supra note 25, at 10–13. 
 478 Doe v. Yuntis, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3, *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 
2000), aff'd sub nom., Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). 
 479 Quintessence Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/quintessence (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (defining “quintessence” as “the essence of 
a thing in its purest and most concentrated form”). 
 480 To some extent, one might detect a similar logic at work in Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 
381 (D.R.I. 1980), discussed supra Part III.A, where the court stressed that Fricke “is exclusively 
homosexual and could not conscientiously date girls” and that “it would be dishonest to his 
own sexual identity to take a girl to the dance.” 491 F. Supp. at 383, 385. Yet even in these 
passages, the court was careful to note that “it was possible he might someday be bisexual,” and 
he was “perhaps not irrevocably committed to a homosexual orientation.” Id. at 383, 385. In 
addition, the court emphasized that it was upholding Fricke’s right to attend the dance as an 
expression of a particular viewpoint: “[H]is attendance would have a certain political element 
and would be a statement for equal rights and human rights” and “attending the dance with 
another young man would be a political statement.” Id. at 385. 
 481 Currah, supra note 25, at 18. 
 482 Id. at 13. 
 483 Id. at 20 
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C.     Gender Roles and the First Amendment: Gender as Viewpoint 
But hope springs for queer theory yet—in Mississippi, of all places. 
Only three years ago, in the highly publicized case McMillen v. 
Itawamba County School District, a federal judge upheld a lesbian 
student’s right to bring her girlfriend to the prom while wearing a 
tuxedo.484 By vindicating the student’s homosexuality and gender 
variance as both status and speech—i.e., identity and viewpoint—this 
ruling blazed a new path toward the protection of every child’s right to 
be queer. 
In 2010, Constance McMillen was a senior at Itawamba 
Agricultural High School in Fulton, Mississippi.485 Since eighth grade, 
she had “openly identified” as a lesbian at school.486 In the fall of her 
senior year, she asked her girlfriend, a fellow student at Itawamba, to be 
her prom date.487 
The Itawamba prom was scheduled to be held on April 2, 2010; in 
February, McMillen asked an assistant principal for permission to 
attend with her girlfriend.488 The assistant principal informed her that 
“they could attend with two guys as their dates but could not attend 
together as a couple.”489 McMillen reiterated her request to the principal 
and superintendent; they told her that “the two could attend separately 
but not together as a couple,” and moreover, “she and her girlfriend 
would not be allowed to slow dance together because it could ‘push 
people’s buttons.’”490 The superintendent warned her that “if she and 
her girlfriend made anyone uncomfortable while at the prom, they 
would be ‘kicked out.’”491 During this meeting, McMillen also asked 
whether she would be permitted to wear a tuxedo to the prom in lieu of 
a dress. The principal and the superintendent informed her that “only 
boys were allowed to wear tuxedos.”492 After checking with the Board of 
Education, the superintendent added that “girls were not allowed to 
even wear slacks and a nice top but must wear a dress.”493 
McMillen contacted the ACLU, which sent a letter to the school 
and the board demanding that both policies be changed.494 Rather than 
changing the policies, the Itawamba School Board issued a press release 
 
 484 702 F. Supp. 2d 699 (N.D. Miss. 2010). 
 485 Id. at 701. 
 486 Id. 
 487 Id. 
 488 Id. 
 489 Id. 
 490 Id. 
 491 Id. 
 492 Id. 
 493 Id. 
 494 Id. 
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announcing that the prom would be cancelled.495 Citing “the 
distractions to the educational process caused by recent events,” as well 
as concerns about “the education, safety, and well being of our 
students,” the Board announced that “the Itawamba School District has 
decided to not host a prom at Itawamba Agricultural High School this 
year.”496 Calling to mind the closings of public pools in the civil rights 
era,497 the Board invited parents to arrange a private prom off campus: 
“It is our hope that private citizens will organize an event for the juniors 
and seniors.”498 
McMillen’s challenge serves as an object lesson in how one might 
present status and speech claims alongside one another, without trying 
to resolve any underlying tension between them.499 While McMillen 
primarily challenged the school’s actions as a means of suppressing her 
constitutionally protected viewpoint, she did not hesitate to explain the 
profound and personal injuries that the school had inflicted on her 
identity, or her sense of self.500 At a hearing on her motion for a 
preliminary injunction, McMillen testified that she thought it was 
important to attend prom because it is a “part of high school that 
everyone remembers” and she wanted to share that experience with her 
girlfriend.501 She insisted that “she does not want to hide her sexual 
orientation,” and she objected that “the school is attempting to force her 
to pretend that she is someone she is not by going with a male date.”502 
She explained: “[I]f [I] cannot share the prom experience with [my] 
girlfriend then there is not any point in going.”503 Finally, she insisted 
that “gay students have the same right as straight students to not only 
attend the prom with the person they are dating but also to dance with 
that person.”504 
 
 495 Id. at 701–02. 
 496 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 497 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 498 McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the 
school argued that “the School Board did not cancel the prom but merely ‘withdrew its 
sponsorship[,]’” the court dismissed this argument as “nothing more than semantics.” Id. at 
702. In addition, the court found no evidence to support the board’s claim that hosting the 
prom would “disrupt its ability to govern local schools and provide and manage a public 
education program for all students.” Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 499 Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 159, at 13 (arguing for “a multi-pronged movement . . . whose 
minority-model and universalist-model strategies . . . proceed in parallel without any high 
premium placed on ideological rationalization between them”); id. at 41 (arguing that “gay-
affirmative work does well when it aims to minimize its reliance on any particular account of 
the origin of sexual preference and identity in individuals”). 
 500 See McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
 501 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 502 Id. 
 503 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 504 Id. 
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Turning to her desire to wear a tuxedo, McMillen argued that 
“students should not be forced to wear clothes that conform to 
traditional gender norms.”505 She testified that she wanted to wear a 
tuxedo to the prom to send a message to her community that “it’s 
perfectly okay for a woman to wear a tuxedo, and that the school 
shouldn’t be allowed to make girls wear a dress if that’s not what they 
are comfortable in.”506 Just as she would not attend the prom without 
her girlfriend, she testified that she “does not want to attend the prom if 
[the school] does not allow female students to wear tuxedos.”507 
Notwithstanding the legal system’s investment in identity politics, 
the court embraced all of McMillen’s constitutional claims, without 
privileging one over another. Emphasizing the constitutional 
connections between speech and status, the court began an analysis of 
McMillen’s speech claims by invoking Romer’s holding that “[i]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”508 In characterizing McMillen’s claims, the court allowed her 
identity and her viewpoint to play off one another, without collapsing 
the latter into the former: “Constance claims Defendants . . . censor[ed] 
her peaceful expression of social and political viewpoints central to her 
sexuality.”509 Citing Fricke, the court noted that McMillen’s claims 
closely tracked Aaron Fricke’s beliefs that “it would be dishonest to his 
own sexual identity to take a girl to the dance” and “his attendance 
would have a certain political element and would be a statement for 
equal rights and human rights.”510 Turning to McMillen’s claim that she 
should be permitted to wear a tuxedo, the court did not shy away from 
recognizing her freedom to dissent from traditional gender roles: 
“Constance requested permission to wear a tuxedo . . . with the intent of 
communicating to the school community her social and political views 
that women should not be constrained to wear clothing that has 
traditionally been deemed ‘female’ attire.”511 
In a tragic twist, however, McMillen also serves as an object lesson 
in the limits of judicial power, and more generally, the law’s limited 
ability to affect social norms.512 After finding the school liable on all of 
 
 505 Id. 
 506 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 507 Id. 
 508 Id. at 703 (alterations in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 509 Id. 
 510 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D.R.I. 1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 511 Id. at 704. 
 512 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
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McMillen’s claims, the court concluded that it would not be in the 
“public interest” to issue an injunction against the school, based on the 
school’s claim that “a parent sponsored prom which is open to all [the 
school’s] students had been planned and is scheduled for April 2, 
2010.”513 Although the court admitted that “the details of the ‘private’ 
prom are unknown to the Court,” it relied on the school’s 
“representations . . . that all [the school’s] students, including the 
Plaintiff, are welcome and encouraged to attend.”514 In light of these 
claims, the court reasoned that compelling the school to take over 
sponsorship of the prom “would only confuse and confound the 
community on the issue.”515 Given that “[p]arents have taken the 
initiative to plan and pay for a ‘private’ prom,” the court was reluctant to 
“defeat the purpose and efforts of those individuals.”516 
Unfortunately, the court’s confidence in the community and the 
school was misplaced. On April 2, McMillen and her girlfriend showed 
up to the “private” prom, only to discover that they had been tricked.517 
While only a handful of unpopular students attended the event with 
McMillen and her girlfriend, the rest of the senior class was gathering 30 
miles away in a local community center, at a secret event arranged by 
parents and staff.518 A few months after McMillen resumed her lawsuit, 
the school settled the case by paying $35,000 and adopting a policy that 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, 
and gender expression within the school district.519 In an ominous sign 
that this struggle continues, a neighboring county’s school board 
authorized parents to take over sponsorship of all future proms.520 
 
DISPUTES viii (1991) (arguing that “people frequently resolve their disputes . . . without paying 
any attention to the laws that apply to those disputes”); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (identifying a series of constraints 
that prevent courts from producing significant social reforms). 
 513 McMillen, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 706. 
 514 Id. 
 515 Id. 
 516 Id. 
 517 Sheila Byrd, Miss. Board Denies Staging ‘Sham’ Prom for Lesbian, BOSTON.COM (May 24, 
2010), http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/2010/05/24/miss_board_denies_
staging_sham_prom_for_lesbian.  
 518 Neal Broverman, ACLU Investigating Fake Prom, ADVOCATE (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2010/04/05/aclu-investigating-fake-prom; 
Mississippi School Pays Damages to Lesbian Teen Over Prom Dispute, CNN (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/07/20/mississippi.lesbian.settlement/index.html; Mary 
Elizabeth Williams, Fake Prom Staged to Trick Lesbian Kids, SALON (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.salon.com/2010/04/06/constance_mcmillen_fake_prom. In a remarkable display of 
how social hierarchies intersect, the fake prom was attended by two students with learning 
disabilities, in addition to McMillen and her girlfriend. Broverman, supra; Williams, supra. 
 519 Lesbian High School Student Constance McMillen Gets $35,000 Settlement For Canceled 
Prom, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/20/
constance-mcmillen-settlement_n_653331.html  
 520 Byrd, supra note 517. 
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D.     Equal Protection: Transgender Status 
Of course, there is no special need to defend children’s gender 
variance only under the First Amendment, without also bringing 
parallel claims under the Constitution’s equal protection and due 
process guarantees. In the recent case Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of 
discrimination based on sex, which is therefore subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.521 Other courts have not yet 
had an opportunity to address this issue, but several have applied this 
framework for analyzing gender-identity claims under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.522 
For present purposes, however, the application of heightened 
scrutiny and the analogy to sex discrimination is overkill. In light of the 
basic principle articulated in Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor, 
there is no reason to think that equal protection applies to children who 
are transgender any less forcefully than it applies to children who are 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Given that these cases were decided under 
rational basis review, they establish a principle that applies in the same 
manner to discrimination against any class.523 Under this principle, the 
state could not have a legitimate interest in discouraging children from 
being transgender, because this kind of justification fails any standard of 
judicial review. There is no basis to claim that the state’s interest in 
discouraging transgender status should be subjected to a lower standard, 
because there is no lower standard to which it could be subjected. 
 
 521 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 522 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
“employers who discriminate against men because they . . . wear dresses and makeup, or 
otherwise act femininely, are . . . engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination 
would not occur but for the victim’s sex”); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is 
forbidden until Title VII.”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(holding that “because gender identity is a component of sex, discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity is sex discrimination”); Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 
WL 1435995, at *4 (Apr. 20, 2012) (ruling that “claims of discrimination based on transgender 
status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable 
under Title VII”). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that “discrimination against a transsexual based on the person’s status as a transsexual 
is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII”). 
 523 For example, in Cleburne, discussed supra Part I.C.2, the Court implied that it had 
applied the same principle in Zobel v. Williams, a successful challenge to Alaska’s distribution 
of annual dividends to citizens based on how long they had resided in the state. City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 63 (1982)). 
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E.     Due Process: Gender-Variant Conduct 
Because Lawrence’s bar against moral justifications is based on a 
similar logic, it applies with no less force to the moral disapproval of 
children’s gender-variant behavior. As Professors Julie Greenberg and 
Marybeth Herald have explained: “If the choice of one’s sexual partner 
is considered one of the most intimate and personal choices a person 
can make, then a person’s choice to live in the sex role that matches her 
self-identity must also be included.”524 Following this lead, several 
scholars have argued that, at the very least, Lawrence prohibits the state 
from invoking “moral disapproval” as a justification for restricting a 
person’s right to engage in gender-variant conduct.525 
While these arguments seem compelling, they have not yet been 
adopted by courts in reported decisions.526 As a matter of law, if not 
logic, lawyers and judges have been more inclined to consider an 
individual’s gender variance under the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause, rather than articulating an individual’s liberty 
interest in gender-variant conduct under the Due Process Clause. In her 
essay What Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 
Professor Chai Feldblum hints that this trend may have more to do with 
the checkered history of the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence than with anything about gender variance.527 Rather than 
 
 524 Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It With You: Constitutional 
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 881 (2005). 
 525 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What 
Lawrence Can Mean For Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115 (2006); 
Taylor Flynn, Sex and (Sexed By) the State, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 217 (2004); Jillian T. 
Weiss, Gender Autonomy, Transgender Identity and Substantive Due Process: Finding a 
Rational Basis for Lawrence v. Texas, 5 J. RACE GENDER & ETHNICITY 2, 2 (2010); Laura K. 
Langley, Note, Self-Determination in a Gender Fundamentalist State: Toward Legal Liberation 
of Transgender Identities, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 101, 128 (2006). 
 526 In one reported opinion in 1975, a federal judge suggested that a transgender person’s 
“interest in privacy” might be implicated, “at least tangentially,” by the state’s refusal to change 
her sex designation on a birth certificate. Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Conn. 
1975). More recently, in an unreported ruling, an Alaska trial court held that the state’s refusal 
to allow a transgender person to change the sex designation on her driver’s license violated a 
transgender person’s “interest in protecting sensitive personal information from public 
disclosure”—a right analogous to a constitutional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters that has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. K.L. v. State, No. 3AN–
11–05431 CI, 2012 WL 2685183, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012); see also Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Applying this information privacy framework, the Alaska court reasoned 
that “one’s transgendered status is private, sensitive personal information,” and the state’s 
policy “can lead to the forced disclosure of the person’s transgendered status.” K.L., 2012 WL 
2685183, at *6. Because the court found that this infringement was not justified by the state’s 
asserted interests in “having accurate documentation and identification and preventing fraud or 
falsification of identity documents,” the court declined to decide whether the policy also 
violated the plaintiff’s interest in “personal autonomy and independence in decision-making.” 
Id. at *4, *6. 
 527 Feldblum, supra note 525. 
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exposing judges to charges of “activism” for “inventing” new rights, 
advocates may be strategically inclined to invoke the more popular and 
familiar terms of free speech and equal protection. But the liberty to 
engage in gender-variant conduct will not be recognized unless and 
until it has been asserted. As Currah puts it, “we will arrive at that 
moment, in part, by working to change the commonsense truths about 
gender and by making those claims in as many ways and in as many 
venues as possible.”528 
VI.     THEORIZING CHILDREN’S QUEERNESS 
This Part explores the metes and bounds of No Promo Hetero—the 
principle that the state may not promote heteronormativity in 
childhood, for the same reasons that it may not pursue this goal at any 
age. It argues that this principle enjoys two advantages over other 
arguments on behalf of children’s queerness: universality and liberalism. 
First, the principle makes a claim for the liberation of all children’s 
queerness, rather than limiting itself to a claim for the equal treatment 
of children who are, or identify as, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transgender.529 Second, the principle entertains the liberal premise of a 
neutral and limited state, rather than insisting upon the celebration of 
children’s queerness in public and private spheres.530 By charting a 
course that is both liberal and queer, No Promo Hetero avoids the 
essentialism of identity politics while speaking in a language that judges, 
lawyers, and lobbyists find familiar. 
A.     Queering the State: No Promo Hetero 
Almost twenty years ago, in her pioneering essay Queering the 
State,531 Lisa Duggan proposed a novel way for the LGBT movement to 
answer the opposition’s “No Promo Homo” campaigns. Rather than 
insisting that homosexuality was innate or immutable, she suggested a 
“No Promo Hetero” campaign—a comprehensive attack against the 
 
 528 Currah, supra note 25, at 20. 
 529 See KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD: OR GROWING SIDEWAYS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 9 (2008). But see Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal 
Construction of the Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
269, 273 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he first step in the protection of gay kids must be to see them 
as gay kids; unless the law is able to name the child, it will be unable to safeguard him or her” 
(emphasis added)). 
 530 See Rachmilovitz, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that parents who pressure children into 
“mainstream sexuality” violate children’s identity rights). 
 531 Duggan, supra note 26. 
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state’s promotion of heteronormativity through public institutions, 
policies, and practices.532 
Duggan developed No Promo Hetero by analogy to the liberal 
doctrine of the separation of church and state.533 Rather than borrowing 
the rhetoric of minority rights, she urged advocates to “borrow from 
and transform another liberal discourse, that surrounding the effort to 
disestablish state religion, to separate church and state.”534 “We might 
become the new disestablishmentarians,” she explained, “the state 
religion we wish to disestablish being the religion of 
heteronormativity.”535 Just as the state may not act for the purpose of 
promoting Christianity, it may not act for the purpose of promoting 
heterosexuality or gender conformity.536 
B.     Universalism: Beyond Status 
As Duggan observed, No Promo Hetero is more universal than 
conventional claims for LGBT rights. By attacking the state’s promotion 
of heteronormativity, it allows advocates to fend off the familiar charge 
that they are seeking “special rights” for a protected class of LGBT 
people.537 Rather than coming off as “narrow and parochial,” the 
argument “makes a case for freedom of association (to form 
relationships) and freedom of speech (acknowledgement or assertion) 
for everyone.”538 
It is not only universal; it is universalizing.539 Unlike the LGBT 
movement’s traditional response to No Promo Homo campaigns, No 
Promo Hetero does not depend upon the notion that an individual’s 
sexual orientation and gender identity are fixed early in life, and cannot 
be influenced by parents, teachers, or the government itself.540 As 
Duggan writes, “[i]f sexual desire is compared to religion, we can see it 
as not natural, fixed, or ahistorical, yet not trivial or shallow.”541 In 
principle, this paradigm could provide an argument on behalf of 
 
 532 Id. at 8–9. 
 533 Id. at 9. 
 534 Id. 
 535 Id. 
 536 Id. For similar analogies to the Establishment Clause, see David B. Cruz, Disestablishing 
Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2002); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing 
the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010); Rosky, supra note 160, at 956–75. 
 537 Duggan, supra note 26, at 9. 
 538 Id. at 10. 
 539 See SEDGWICK, supra note 159, at 1 (distinguishing between “minoritizing” and 
“universalizing” definitions of homosexuality). 
 540 See Duggan, supra note 26, at 9–10. 
 541 Id.at 9. 
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anyone’s potential for queerness, while still insisting on the protection 
of individuals who identify as LGBT.542 
The benefits of universalism seem especially significant in debates 
over children’s queerness, because the question of any particular child’s 
identity is often sharply contested. Rather than confessing a fear that 
children will “become” lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, opponents 
of LGBT rights more often claim that children might be “confused,”543 
while they are going through a “phase”544—experiences that they claim 
are typical throughout childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood.545 
By insisting that the state has no legitimate interest in promoting 
heteronormativity in childhood, advocates obviate the need to show that 
any particular child is “really” LGBT. 
In translating No Promo Hetero into the discourse of 
constitutional law, this Article has sought to preserve the principle’s 
universality in several ways. First, as the Article’s title suggests, the 
argument has been framed principally as an attack against the state’s 
interest—the promotion of heteronormativity in children—and only 
secondarily as the vindication of children’s right to be queer. By 
challenging the legitimacy of the state’s interest, this argument largely 
avoids the need to carefully delimit the scope of children’s constitutional 
rights. First and foremost, No Promo Hetero is framed as a limitation 
on the government’s role rather than an authorization of children’s 
speech, status, or conduct. 
Second, this Article insists upon the independent merit and value 
of advancing claims based on speech and conduct, rather than 
collapsing them into claims based on status, or ignoring them 
altogether.546 Although speech and conduct claims surely raise “vexing” 
questions in the context of childhood,547 they speak to vital interests and 
groups that may not be accurately represented by the labels lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or transgender.548 
 
 542 In a related context, Kenji Yoshino has observed that rights-based arguments have a 
similar advantage over group-based arguments: They embody the principle of equal treatment, 
rather than drawing distinctions among groups. See Yoshino, supra note 340. 
 543 Ruskola, supra note 529, at 270. 
 544 Id. at 280. 
 545 See, e.g., Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “this danger may be particularly acute in the university setting where many 
students are still coping with the sexual problems which accompany late adolescence and early 
adulthood”). 
 546 Cf. Cain, supra note 27, at 1619–40 (arguing that lesbian and gay litigators should not 
“bifurcate” constitutional claims based on status and conduct). 
 547 See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 548 Cf. Halley, supra note 13, at 567 (“When pro-gay advocates use the argument from 
immutability before a court on behalf of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, they misrepresent 
us.”). 
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Finally, this Article challenges the promotion of heteronormativity 
under rational basis review, rather than depending upon the application 
of heightened scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. In doing so, the argument avoids relying on the claim 
that homosexuality or gender variance is an “obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristic[].”549 Apart from the strategic advantages 
of avoiding the nature/nurture debates, this approach has the benefit of 
challenging the belief that queerness is inferior and should be 
contained.550 
C.     Liberalism: Beyond the State 
Even as No Promo Hetero avoids the pitfalls of essentialism, it 
remains liberal enough to be rendered in constitutional terms. As 
Duggan notes, the argument appeals to the liberal ideal of a neutral and 
limited state, much like the No Promo Homo campaign to which it 
responds.551 By invoking the ideal of the state’s neutrality, it offers 
lobbyists, lawyers, and activists a way to sidestep protracted debates over 
the etiology and morality of children’s queerness. Duggan explains: “As 
in the case of religious differences, we do not need to persuade or 
convert others to our view. We simply argue for ‘disestablishment’ of 
state endorsement for one view over another.”552 In advancing this 
argument, advocates would not need to ask anyone to accept the claim 
that children are “born” lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, let alone 
to “celebrate” children’s homosexuality or gender variance. Whatever 
one thinks of such matters, advocates may insist that the state should 
not be permitted to take sides. 
Duggan warns, however, that this commitment to liberalism may 
be both virtue and vice: “Because this case is formulated within the 
terms of liberalism, it may trap us in as many ways as it releases us.”553 
In particular, she worries that the argument “seems to construct a zone 
of liberty in negative relation to the state,” insofar as “it argues about 
what the state canNOT do.”554 
 
 549 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Halley, supra note 13, at 567; Kenji Yoshino, 
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). 
 550 For criticisms of the immutability requirement, see Halley, supra note 13, and Yoshino, 
supra note 549. 
 551 See Duggan, supra note 26, at 8. 
 552 Id. at 10. 
 553 Id. at 10–11. 
 554 Id. at 11. To guard against this risk, Duggan recommends “carefully fram[ing]” the 
argument in two ways: first, “to emphasize that state institutions must be evenhanded in the 
arena of sexuality, not that sexuality should be removed from state action completely,” and 
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Duggan’s qualms about the limits of liberalism are especially 
relevant in the context of childhood, because children do not enjoy the 
same degree of autonomy as adults, especially with regard to sexuality 
and gender. In most cases, the regulation of children’s sexual and gender 
development is privatized: It is governed by family, friends, and social 
norms more than teachers, judges, and legal rules. Within the domain of 
the family, the Constitution generally permits parents to rule the roost. 
Ninety years ago, the Supreme Court held that parents have the 
fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of their 
children,555 and the Court reaffirmed this principle as recently as 
thirteen years ago.556 Under this doctrine, the state must presume that 
parents act in their children’s best interests, unless a court determines 
that a parent is no longer fit to care for a child, or that a child has been 
abused or neglected.557 
Whatever one thinks of this balance of power, No Promo Hetero 
does not seek to change it. Within broad boundaries, it permits parents 
to do precisely what it prohibits the state from doing—attempting to 
influence children’s sexual and gender development toward a particular 
result. Some parents will encourage children to be straight, others will 
encourage them to be queer, and still others will take a neutral stance, 
granting children the freedom to explore such questions for themselves. 
Within what boundaries? For present purposes, the existing body 
of abuse and neglect laws provides a plausible starting point. At a 
minimum, federal law effectively establishes that parents may not act in 
a manner that causes a child’s “death, serious physical or emotional 
harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation, or . . . presents an imminent risk of 
serious harm.”558 So even if parents may attempt to encourage a child to 
be straight or discourage them from being queer, they may not do so in 
any manner that poses an imminent risk of serious harm to the child. 
To explain how this principle is likely to play out in actual cases, it 
may be useful to consider a pair of opposing examples. On the one 
hand, imagine a typical scenario in which a mother encourages her son 
to ask a girl on a date, or “find a nice girl and settle down,” without 
having any particular reason to believe that the boy is straight, gay, or 
bisexual. Strictly speaking, the mother has encouraged her child to be 
 
second, to “make the crucial distinction between state institutions (which must, in some sense, 
be neutral) and ‘the public’ arena, where explicit advocacy is not only allowable but desirable.” 
Id. 
 555 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 556 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 76 (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 557 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). 
 558 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-320, § 142, 124 Stat. 3459, 3482. 
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heterosexual—or at least, to pursue heterosexual relationships. But 
whatever the merits of the mother’s behavior, this single act of 
encouragement would fall far short of abuse or neglect under any 
plausible standard. 
On the other hand, imagine parents subjecting a girl to “reparative” 
or “conversion” therapy against her will, in an effort to “change” the 
girl’s sexual orientation from lesbian to heterosexual.559 Although this 
case is surely rarer than the last one, it is no more hypothetical: In a 
recent Utah case, when a sixteen-year-old girl came out to her parents, 
they responded by placing her with another family that “specialized in 
reforming gay teenagers.”560 Serving as the girl’s legal guardians, the new 
family forced her to stand against a wall for long periods of time and 
wear a backpack filled with rocks “to bear the burden of 
homosexuality,”561 and they told her that “your parents don’t want you” 
and “you are going to hell.”562 On at least one occasion, one of the 
guardians hit the girl when she tried to escape.563 
After the girl was removed by the Department of Child and Family 
Services, the State of Utah took the position that the parents had a 
constitutional right to determine the girl’s sexual orientation as one 
dimension of a parent’s right to direct the care, custody, and control of a 
child.564 The juvenile court disagreed. The court issued a temporary 
order ordering the parents to attend a local meeting of Parents, Family, 
& Friends of Lesbians and Gays and prohibiting them from making any 
further attempts to change the girl’s sexual orientation.565 
Following a series of sharply contested hearings, the parties entered 
a stipulated court order that authorized the girl to live with her 
grandparents.566 The order allowed the girl’s parents to maintain legal 
custody over the girl’s upbringing, subject to a series of No Promo 
 
 559 See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS FOR A BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HOMOSEXUALITY 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/sorientation.pdf. 
 560 Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order in Child Welfare Proceeding at 2–
3 State of Utah in re Jane Doe, a Child Under the Age of 18, (on file with author). This account 
is based upon a series of interviews conducted with Ms. Doe’s lawyer and my independent 
review of transcripts, pleadings, and court orders from the relevant proceedings. Because Ms. 
Doe was a minor throughout the proceedings, the record of this case is classified as a “private 
record,” which may be reviewed only with Ms. Doe’s consent. Both my interview and my 
review of the record were conducted with Ms. Doe’s consent, pursuant to an ongoing 
confidentiality agreement with Ms. Doe’s lawyer. 
 561 Id. at 2. 
 562 Stipulated Amended Pretrial, Adjudication and Disposition, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order at 4, State of Utah in re Jane Doe (on file with author). 
 563 Id. 
 564 Audio Recording of Hearing on Motion to Disqualify Guardian Ad Litem, State of Utah 
in re Jane Doe (on file with author). 
 565 Id. 
 566 Stipulated Amended Pretrial, Adjudication and Disposition, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order at 3, State of Utah in re Jane Doe (on file with author). 
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Hetero conditions. Under the court’s order, the parents were prohibited 
from discussing the girl’s sexual orientation with her without her 
consent, except during court-ordered family counseling sessions, and 
prohibited them from restricting the girl’s dating and associations based 
on a person’s sexual orientation or gender.567 In addition, the parents 
were required to allow the girl to engage in “normal teenager activities,” 
including dating other girls and attending dances, and to allow her to 
join her school’s Gay-Straight Alliance and the local chapter of Parents, 
Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG).568 
Needless to say, these cases represent two endpoints along a broad 
spectrum of potential scenarios; it is easy to imagine any number of 
cases between these extremes. But the existence of hard cases does not 
cast doubt on the principle’s merit: The state may not encourage 
children to be straight or discourage them from being queer; parents 
may try to do so, but only so long as they do not cross the line into 
abuse or neglect. 
Like many child welfare determinations, such cases would turn on 
the prevailing consensus of physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists 
who study child development. During the past several decades, a broad 
consensus has developed among medical professionals that 
homosexuality is not a mental illness and that therapies aimed at 
changing a minor’s sexual orientation are harmful and dangerous.569 By 
contrast, the American Psychiatric Association has only recently taken 
steps to de-stigmatize the diagnosis of “Gender Identity Disorder,” 
which is now known as “Gender Dysphoria.”570 Even now, some 
licensed physicians continue to support “corrective therapy” for 
children who receive this diagnosis.571 In light of these ongoing 
disagreements, courts may be less willing to conclude that forcing 
children into corrective therapy for Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood is a form of abuse or neglect.572 
 
 567 Id. at 8–9. 
 568 Id. 
 569 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS ET AL., JUST THE FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND YOUTH: A PRIMER FOR PRINCIPALS, EDUCATORS, AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL 5–9 (2008), 
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/just-the-facts.pdf (public statement on behalf 
of twelve major public and mental health organizations). 
 570 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 521 (5th ed. 2013); J. Bryan Lowder, Being Transgender Is No Longer a Disorder, 
SLATE (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/
2012/12/dsm_revision_and_sexual_identity_gender_identity_disorder_replaced_by_gender. 
html. 
 571 See Erika D. Skougard, Note, The Best Interests of Transgender Children, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 1161, 1162–63 (observing that “[c]hildhood gender experts are sharply divided about the 
best treatment for . . . children” who are diagnosed with “Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood”). 
 572 See id. In September 2012, the California Legislature attempted to resolve this issue on a 
statewide level by adopting a law that prohibits the practice of “conversion therapy” on minors, 
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But if we focus only on traditional settings in which the state stands 
in the background—paradigmatically, two married parents raising a 
child together—we miss No Promo Hetero’s most powerful thrust. 
Libertarian mythology aside, the state acts parens patriae or in loco 
parentis in innumerable ways, meddling both directly and indirectly in 
children’s development. Adoption and foster care are only the most 
obvious examples; when parents divorce, they are subject to a judge’s 
determination of children’s best interests in custody and visitation 
proceedings.573 In public schools, the modern state is ubiquitous—in the 
hiring and firing of teachers,574 the setting of curriculums,575 even the 
acquisition of library books.576 In public hospitals, physicians routinely 
designate newborns as “male” or “female,” and prescribe cosmetic 
genital surgeries and hormone treatments for children who fall outside 
the binary model of gender and sex.577 Even when judges review the 
constitutionality of marriage and sodomy laws, they have articulated 
abstract visions of children’s best interests. Under a regime of No 
Promo Hetero, the promotion of heterosexuality and gender conformity 
would be banished from all of these settings. 
Admittedly, some readers of this Article will have more sweeping 
ambitions—ambitions that cannot be satisfied by a liberal principle like 
No Promo Hetero. To such readers, I can only confess that I share many 
of these ambitions myself, at least on a personal level—and indeed, that 
 
effectively establishing that this practice is a form of child abuse. Erik Eckholm, Gay ‘Cure’ For 
Minors Is Banned In California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at A16. Although the law prohibits 
“sexual orientation change efforts,” it defines this term to include “efforts to change behaviors 
or gender expressions,” as well as efforts “to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions 
or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (West 
2013) (emphasis added). 
  Shortly after the law was passed, it was challenged by a group of families and licensed 
therapists under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. AnneClaire Stapleton, 
California Law Banning Gay “Conversion Therapy” Put on Hold, CNN (Dec. 22, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/04/us/california-gay-therapy-ban. In a recent ruling, the Ninth 
Circuit denied a preliminary injunction that would have prevented the law from going into 
effect. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 573 See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender 
of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 294–98 (2009) (observing that in custody and 
visitation cases, litigants, experts, and judges often express concerns that lesbian and gay 
parents will serve as “role models,” influencing children’s sexual and gender development). 
 574 See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977) 
(upholding the firing of gay teacher based on “danger of encouraging expression of approval 
and of imitation” because “[s]uch students could treat the retention of the high school teacher 
by the school board as indicating adult approval of his homosexuality”). 
 575 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of claims by 
parents seeking to exempt children from “indoctrination” through elementary school lessons 
featuring children’s books about same-sex couples). 
 576 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (invalidating school board’s decision to 
remove “filthy” books from libraries at high schools and junior high schools). 
 577 See JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 11–26 
(2012). 
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this Article’s embrace of liberalism is strategic, more than anything else. 
Rather than conceding that the government is actually neutral and 
limited, this Article deploys the ideal of the liberal state against 
governments that actually exist, in order to demonstrate one of the 
many ways in which they have failed to live up to this ideal. For if the 
state is neutral and limited, then it may no longer seek to pursue an 
objective that it has long asserted in strenuous terms—the promotion of 
heteronormativity in childhood. 
CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Windsor, the defenders of “traditional” marriage 
trotted out a familiar argument in support of the Defense of Marriage 
Act. Among other things, they claimed that the law was justified by the 
government’s interest in “[p]romoting [c]hildrearing by [b]oth a 
[m]other and a [f]ather.”578 Because of “the different challenges faced by 
boys and girls as they grow to adulthood,” they reasoned, it was “at least 
rational to think that children benefit from having parental role models 
of both sexes.”579 As the term “role model” suggests, they claimed that 
children would “benefit” from having both a mother and a father by 
learning the appropriate ways to be male or female, masculine or 
feminine, mother or father. “Men and women are different,” they 
explained, “[s]o are mothers and fathers.”580 
In the congressional debates over DOMA, the law’s sponsors were 
less cryptic about the lessons that they sought to impart to “the children 
of America.”581 By posing a series of rhetorical questions, Representative 
Charles Canady signaled that the law was designed to channel children 
into heterosexual relationships: 
Should this Congress tell the children of America that it is a matter of 
indifference whether they establish families with a partner of the 
opposite sex or cohabit with someone of the same sex?  
Should this Congress tell the children of America that we as a society 
believe there is no moral difference between homosexual 
relationships and heterosexual relationships? 
Should this Congress tell the children of America that in the eyes of 
the law the parties to a homosexual union are entitled to all the rights 
 
 578 BLAG Brief, supra note 393, at 48. 
 579 Id. 
 580 Id. 
 581 142 CONG. REC. H7491 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Charles Canady). 
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and privileges that have always been reserved for a man and a woman 
united in marriage?582 
In a legislative report supporting the bill, Representative Canady 
cautioned his colleagues “against doing anything which might mislead 
wavering children into perceiving society as indifferent to the sexual 
orientation they develop,” in order to protect society’s interest “in 
reproducing itself.”583 
In striking down DOMA, the Supreme Court found that the law 
actually harmed children, rather than benefitting them. In addition to 
finding that the law “injure[s],” “disparage[s],” and “demean[s]” same-
sex couples,584 the Court declared that DOMA “humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”585 As if 
that were not enough, the Court added that “DOMA also brings 
financial harm to children of same-sex couples” by raising “the cost of 
health care for families” and denying “benefits allowed to families upon 
the loss of a spouse and parent.”586 Because the Court found that these 
injuries were not justified by any “legitimate purpose,”587 it held that the 
law violated the “basic due process and equal protection principles” of 
the Fifth Amendment.588 
It is impossible to overstate the significance of this legal victory to 
the LGBT movement. For far too long, our legal system has presumed 
that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting heteronormativity in 
childhood. In the name of protecting children from the influences of 
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval, opponents of LGBT 
rights have successfully defended a broad range of policies that 
discriminate against LGBT people. 
Until recently, advocates of LGBT rights have responded by 
challenging these policies on strictly empirical grounds. They have 
attacked the factual premise that queerness can be contained, rather 
than challenging the legal premise that queerness may be contained. If 
only for the purpose of argument, they have entertained the troubling 
assumption that queerness is immoral, harmful, or inferior, and thus, 
that the state may legitimately discourage children from becoming 
queer. 
Relying on some of the most basic principles of constitutional 
jurisprudence, this Article exploits an existing gap between fact and law. 
 
 582 Id. (emphasis added). 
 583 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 n.53 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919 
n.53 (emphasis added) (quoting E.L. Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENT. 22–23 
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 584 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692, 2695–96 (2013). 
 585 Id. at 2694.  
 586 Id. at 2695. 
 587 Id. at 2696. 
 588 Id. at 2693. 
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It argues that even if the fear’s empirical predictions were correct—even 
if exposing children to queerness makes them more likely to be queer—
this fact would not be legally relevant. Dissenting from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s refusal to reconsider the constitutionality of Florida’s adoption 
law, Judge Rosemary Barkett conveyed this Article’s argument perfectly 
well: “In our democracy, . . . it is not the province of the State, even if it 
were able to do so, to dictate or even attempt to influence how its 
citizens should develop their sexual and gender identities.”589 She 
explained: “This approach views homosexuality in and of itself as a 
social harm that must be discouraged”590—a premise foreclosed by the 
First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process 
Clause. 
Forty years after the rise of the modern LGBT movement, the time 
has come to defend children’s queerness, rather than assuring the world 
that homosexuality and gender variance can be quarantined. The state 
does not have any legitimate interest in promoting heteronormativity in 
childhood because it does not have any interest in promoting 
heteronormativity at any age. The Constitution protects every child’s 
right to an open future in sexual and gender development—an equal 
liberty to be straight or queer. 
 
 589 Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 590 Id. 
